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ABSTRACT 
 
Filling the Fulfillment Gap: NGO Refugee Responses in a Time of Rising Populist-
Nationalism 
 
by 
 
Taylor Horton 
 
This thesis seeks to address two main issues. First, how have the recent rise of 
populist-nationalism and the elections of populist-nationalist governments challenged the 
international refugee rights regime? Second, how have humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) responded to new anti-refugee policies, and what does this mean for 
their position within civil society? To answer these questions, this project offers a 
comparative study between the United States under the administration of President Donald 
Trump and Italy under the administration of Deputy Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini. 
By analyzing government and NGO policies for both cases in response to the European 
refugee crisis and the rise of asylum-seekers from Central America, this thesis concludes that 
humanitarian NGOs have undergone fundamental shifts in operations in response to these 
populist-nationalist administrations and their undermining of the refugee rights regime. 
Among these changes include the increasing fulfillment of refugee rights obligations by 
humanitarian NGOs themselves in place of the national government and a turn away from 
political neutrality within humanitarian organizations. This paper concludes by discussing 
what policy changes should be made at the international, state, and NGO level in order to 
best protect refugee rights and NGO operations.  
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Chapter 1: An Order Undermined 
“There are a great number of peoples who need more than just words of sympathy from the 
international community. They need a real and sustained commitment to help end their cycles 
of violence, and launch them on a safe passage to prosperity.” 
-  Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations 
“A large part of history is therefore replete with the struggle for those human rights, an 
eternal struggle in which a final victory can never be won. But to tire in that struggle would 
mean the ruin of society.”  
- Albert Einstein, Founder of the International Rescue Committee 
Introduction and Outline 
Context and Questions 
Over 6 million people have become refugees as a result of the Syrian Civil War, 
which first began in 2011. These 6 million have been dispersed across nearly 50 countries 
worldwide, from Turkey, to Germany, to the United States, and to Argentina. The number of 
internally displaced persons exceeds that of those displaced elsewhere, totaling close to 7 
million as of December 2017. One of the results of this has been a widespread humanitarian 
crisis in which many nations have struggled to process, integrate, and provide basic standards 
of livings for these refugees in need, nearly forty percent of whom are children under the age 
of 12.  
The United States’ response in particular falls in line with its historical tendency to 
underwhelmingly respond to genocide and mass atrocities, maintaining a bureaucratic 
fortress against those that are in need of humanitarian aid. Geographically the U.S. is far 
removed from the ongoing Syrian displacement and it has been able to halt the entrance of 
asylum seekers before they arrive at its borders. Instead, the European Union has been the 
desired destination for many that are fleeing from persecution and violence. While in many 
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instances host societies have been welcoming and integrative, other states have proven to be 
hostile and antagonistic, causing real harm. At the same time, the United States is 
experiencing an increased number of migrants and refugees coming from Central and South 
America. Gang and drug related violence in Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico 
have caused people to seek safety and refuge in the United States, even if they do not meet 
the formal definition of a refugee (Grillo 2018). 
This paper seeks to a fill a gap in the literature on humanitarian efforts of 
nongovernmental organizations. Previous research on NGOs has focused on a variety of 
aspects, from empowering the role of women in development, to the politicisation of aid, to 
the relationship between NGOs and formal (inter)governmental organizations (Baitenmann 
1990; Blue 2005; Charnovitz 1996). In response to the ongoing Syrian refugee displacement, 
the primary research focus in the past 7 years has been on the responses, or lack thereof, of 
states to the displacement. A host of literature has examined and analyzed the responses of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union and its individual members 
(Ostrand 2015, 255). Additionally, there has been a large amount research on the past 
decade’s rise in right-wing populism throughout the EU and U.S., which in and of itself is a 
response to the migrant “crisis.” What has yet to be studied are the effects of populism and 
the populist response to this migrant crisis on the roles and goals of NGOs and humanitarian 
rights organizations. While this research will illustrate many of the policies that states have 
taken in response to migratory displacements and asylum seekers, the central focus will be on 
those policies which either directly affected the work of NGOs or indirectly increased the 
responsibility shared by these same organizations. 
3 
 
 Thus, this paper seeks to answer three primary questions. First, how have NGOs and 
global civil society fit within the greater liberal international order historically? Second, how 
and why have the rise in populism and the new populist governments in Italy and the United 
States affected both the liberal international order itself as well as the positions and 
operations of NGOs in providing refugee rights? Last, how have NGOs adapted to these new 
governments in their responses to humanitarian crises?  
Outline 
The remainder of this chapter will serve to illustrate the theoretical backings behind 
the focal issues of this thesis. First, I will discuss the historical structure of the liberal 
international order (LIO) that arose out of the end of World War II. Within this I will also 
cover the foundations of refugee human rights, global civil society, and the theories 
surrounding their positioning within the greater LIO. Second, I will introduce the rising 
populist-nationalist threat to the LIO in the past decade and the conditions that resulted in 
this new international force contending for influence. 
Chapter 2 will provide a top-down examination of the liberal international order and 
the nationalist changes that have occurred in recent years. Starting at the international level, I 
will work down in scope to the European, followed by Italy, and concluding with the United 
States. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how the post-war system operates at each 
level, to what extent the nationalist challenges exist at each level, and to further detail the 
populist policies and actions taken at each level that are detrimental to the greater liberal 
international order. This will establish the context under which humanitarian NGOs now 
exist and have to operate. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 will cover the responses of NGOs in the United States and Italy 
respectively to the recent humanitarian refugee crises and the populist policies which these 
governments formulated as their own responses. Chapter 5 will conclude this thesis with a 
policy analysis. Along with discussing critical insight gained from working at the 
International Rescue Committee, one of the foremost refugee rights providers in the United 
States, this chapter will serve to discuss the lessons learned and the challenges remaining for 
NGOs and human rights provisions. I will analyze the decisions and changes made thus far 
by NGOs and provide policy suggestions moving forward. I aim to provide at least a glimmer 
of hope for the refugee rights regime and the liberal international order. 
The Liberal International Order, Global Civil Society, and The Refugee Rights Regime 
 The Liberal International Order 
 The post-World War II efforts to establish a multilateral political and economic 
consortium of states succeeded where the post-World War I efforts had failed. Lessons 
learned from the failure of the League of Nations and the end of WWII resulted in the 
establishment of a series of international institutions and agreements to maintain peace and 
foster cooperation in a new postwar era. The United Nations and its human rights 
components, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the World 
Bank, and a multitude of other institutions are what constitute the distinctive system that 
found their start in the years after World War II. However, it is important to note that many 
of these institutions and values did not form a global hegemonic system until after the end of 
the Cold War.   
 What does it mean to have a liberal international order? Several key features are 
characteristic of the LIO: peace, liberal democracy and democratic values, market 
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economies, and transgovernmental communication, to name a few (Slaughter 1995). It is 
furthermore characterized by tenets of interdependence, collective security, and the 
responsibility to protect marginalized and targeted individuals abroad. These features in 
particular are critical in the establishment and maintenance of the human rights regime. By 
intertwining states in multifaceted manners, the overarching goal is cooperation so deep that 
the cost of war between states within the LIO would be far too great compared to the benefits 
of mutual cooperation. However, it would be farcical to say that complete state equality has 
emerged out of this system. While states have been given a seat at the table so to speak, such 
as with the United Nations’ Group of 20 or Group of 77, the 5 members of the UN Security 
Council have remained dominant in the post-World War II system. This is particularly the 
case for the United States, Russia, and China in the past several decades. 
 Realist notions of hard power drove Cold War tensions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The nuclear arms race and the tenets of mutually assured destruction testify 
to this. During the Cold War, the United Nations simply became another ground for realist 
great power politics and national interest to unfold. For example, the USSR and the U.S. 
utilized their UNSC veto 68 times and 61 times, respectively, during the Cold War period, 
often in a tit-for-tat fashion. I mention this primarily to illustrate that the United Nations and 
the LIO are not free of individual motives and realist agendas.  
 The 1970s also marked the beginning of a neoliberal movement in the political-
economic sphere, characterized by “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state 
from many areas of social provision…” (Harvey 2007, 71). Neoliberalism has changed over 
time, but this early variety was based more on its “relation to classical liberalism because of 
its rejection of laissez-faire and emphasis on humanistic values” (Boas and Gans Morse 
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2009, 157). While such neoliberal policies dominated in the United States and much of 
Western Europe, East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea thrived economically 
without any other neoliberal reforms experienced elsewhere. At the same time, in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the “Wall Street–IMF–Treasury complex” that emerged during Bill 
Clinton’s tenure as U.S. president coaxed many developing nations to implement neoliberal 
policies themselves, thereby allowing U.S. economic influence expand even more broadly 
and deeply (Harvey 2007).  
 The liberal international order is undoubtedly imperfect. The United States helped to 
lead the effort to construct the post-war order in part to create a rules-based international 
system to which the U.S. itself was not completely bound. The resulting American 
exceptionalism comes in many forms, from unwillingness to ratify human rights treaties in 
spite of signing them, to unilateral action with little regard for the opinions of international 
institutions, to self-immunity from the International Criminal Court. In an idealistic liberal 
international order, no one would be exempt from any of the provisions set forth, both on 
paper and in practice. In examining the ongoing refugee crises, we bear witness to the limits 
and failures of the state aspects of the LIO as well as to how humanitarian NGOs are 
attempting to uphold the ideal form of the LIO and the international refugee rights regime. 
Global Civil Society 
 What are the factors that contribute to something being part of civil society? The 
generally agreed upon conceptualization of who/what constitutes global civil society is that it 
is made up of non-state, self-governing, voluntary (i.e. not legally required to join), and 
(largely) not for-profit organizations. These can range from humanitarian NGOs like the ones 
discussed in this thesis, to environmental groups, to hospitals, to universities (Salamon et al 
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2004). Clearly, the breadth of the term reaches far across the public sphere. While civil 
society consists of a specific yet varied set of actors, the focus in this paper is primarily on 
humanitarian NGOs.  
It is important to define what I mean when discussing humanitarianism and 
humanitarian organizations. I adopt the definition provided by Christopher Coyne (2013) in 
his extensive critique of state humanitarian intervention. Humanitarianism is thus examined 
as a broader “humanitarian action” that consists of standard state intervention, but also 
enterprises that can exist beyond the state, such as “delivery of short-term emergency relief 
and long-term assistance intended for development purposes in order to alleviate existing 
human suffering and to protect vulnerable people from suffering in the future” (13). This 
definition works to encompass not only traditional humanitarian aid provided by states, but 
also other means utilized by states and international NGOs alike to mitigate whatever the 
humanitarian crisis may be. Furthermore, I wish to account for humanitarianism as a greater 
ethos or ideology that, in part, constitutes global civil society.  
NGOs have been the bearers of transnational civic identities within global 
governance. They themselves are shifting their roles within the global order as part of their 
reactions to these migration and humanitarian crises. While historically the power of NGOs 
has been discursive and normative, this power dynamic is now shifting to one where NGOs 
are actively providing services and rights alongside their advocacy and norm promotion. 
These actions themselves are a form of advocacy and norm promotion, however. In sum, it is 
a shift within the core of civil society. NGOs are now some of the foremost defenders of the 
liberal international order’s refugee rights regime at a time when key states around the world 
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are defecting from this very order. This is why it is critical to examine NGOs during this time 
period. 
This new wave of populist-nationalist policy has created several conflicts for 
humanitarian NGOs. It has created a greater need for providing rights while at the same time 
restricting the ability of NGOs to help provide these rights. For example, this is evident in the 
case of the Trump administration creating family separation detention centers while 
preventing NGOs, legal organizations, and even politicians from gaining access into these 
centers. Other tensions include cuts to funding, the cancellation of certain government 
programs, and lack of transparency that have all created an antagonistic environment through 
which NGOs must now traverse and reorganize themselves. What this ultimately means is 
there is an added layer of complication and obstruction put into place by these governments, 
which compounds the greater movement of downgrading the liberal international order and 
human rights regime.  
NGOs are in a double-edged era of increased responsibility and increased state-
imposed restrictions. At the same time many states are pulling back from humanitarian 
obligations, they are also limiting the efforts of NGOs and civil society to fill in these gaps. 
The 2019 Freedom in the World Report by the NGO Freedom House marked the 13th 
straight year of “decline in global freedoms” and a growing trend of democracy in retreat. 
Part of this are the widespread attacks and impositions placed on civil society, which 
contribute to the drastic “shrinking” of civil space in society (Buyse 2018). As NGOs and 
civil society has less room to navigate state-by-state, dire consequences continue for those 
needing aid. The squeezing of civic space has shown to have damaging effects on 
humanitarian assistance, health, fighting back against climate change, and mediating conflict 
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(Mendelson 2015). This paper will demonstrate how new populist-nationalists have come to 
challenge human rights and NGOs, and how these NGOs have come to navigate this new 
global environment.  
 The Refugee Rights Regime 
 Like the LIO, the foundations of the refugee rights regime came into being in the 
post-World War I era. The League of Nations established the Nansen International Office for 
Refugees and placed it in charge of aiding refugees from war-torn countries from 1930 to 
1939. During this same time period, the League of Nations drafted the 1933 Convention 
Relating to the International Status of Refugees. This Convention dealt with the issue of 
“Nansen passports” for stateless people, the issue of non-refoulement, and the creation of 
several committees for refugees. By doing so, the League of Nations set the precedence for 
the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the creation of 
what is now the modern day refugee rights regime (Jaeger 2001). 
The two initial agreements that came out of this post-war period are the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. The Declaration itself is impressively comprehensive for its time. In 
spite of this, the document comes with many limitations and drawbacks, such as how the 
opening paragraph describes the declaration as only a “common standard for achievement” 
for which all nations should strive. None of the articles are thereby legally binding for a state, 
though this may have been a necessary evil to even allow the formation of the declaration to 
take place. Nevertheless, there are critical articles within the Universal Declaration relating to 
refugee rights, as they set a vital precedent. These provisions include the freedom from 
arbitrary detention (art. 9), the right to leave one’s own country (art. 13), the right to seek 
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asylum in other countries (art. 14), the right to an international order which upholds the rights 
prescribed in the declaration (art. 28), and the prohibition of any actor to destroy or obstruct 
any of the rights provided in the declaration (art. 30). Together these articles constitute the 
first global attempt to protect those fleeing persecution and war.  
While the 1948 Universal Declaration accounts for a broad spectrum of human rights 
protections, the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides for an 
extensive list of protections and provisions for refugees. Perhaps most importantly is the 
creation of a formal definition of what constitutes being a “refugee.” Prior to this point, 
determining the status of a person was largely subjective as no international standardization 
existed. Before the Convention’s revised Protocol in 1967, the treaty only applied to persons 
who would have refugee status prior to the treaty’s signing in 1951. The 1967 Protocol 
removed this temporal aspect, which was a critical step forward for the rights of persons who 
became refugees after 1951.  
 Article 1 of the Convention sets out to define the term “refugee.” The defining factor 
is that one must possess a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion…” by one’s 
national government. Thus, reasons such as famine, war, disease pandemics, or economic 
collapses are all not sufficient enough to make someone a refugee, provided that there is no 
governmental persecution involved. Subsequently, the definition can be extremely limiting in 
its application. Article 3 states that the provisions of the Convention cannot be made, or 
restricted, on the basis of one’s race or religion. This will be useful in examining President 
Trump’s travel ban on Muslims and the subsequent versions of that ban, as well as other 
attacks and rhetoric made by the League in Italy. 
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 Article 33 of the Convention is perhaps one of the most important for examining the 
Italian case. It prohibits the expulsion of a refugee to “the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, [or] 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” This constitutes the principle of 
non-refoulement, a legal obligation that is absolutely crucial when examining the law of the 
sea and humanitarian rescue in the Mediterranean. The 1967 United Nations Declaration on 
Territorial Asylum goes on to reaffirm the obligation of non-refoulement.  
There have been recent efforts made to reaffirm state commitment to the refugee 
rights regime. The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants is one of these. 
The provisions address many of the challenges posed from the new populist-nationalist 
threat, such as xenophobic hostilities. Additionally, the Declaration establishes four main 
goals for the refugee regime moving forward as part of a Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (CRRF): 1. Ease pressures on host countries, 2. Build the self-reliance of 
refugees, 3. Expand access to resettlement, and 4. Foster conditions for refugees to 
voluntarily return home.  
The New York Declaration has since been adopted as part of the larger, 2018 Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, which sought to address "all dimensions 
of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner." While the Compact is 
not legally binding, the United States remained as one of five nations to vote against support 
of the Compact in the United Nations General Assembly. The U.S. was joined by Israel, 
Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, the final three of which represent a fierce anti-migrant, 
anti-refugee position within Europe. Meanwhile, Italy was one of twelve states to abstain 
from voting on the issue. Regardless of the agreement’s non-binding nature, these positions 
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reflect a greater opposition to supranational impositions on state immigration policy, even if 
states are not legally obligated to follow this Compact. 
This portion served to show the common ground on which Italy and the United States 
operate. These aforementioned treaties and agreements are only one part of the refugee rights 
regime, albeit a large one. In the following chapter, I will discuss a vital component in the 
Common European Asylum System and the European Union’s quest to create a 
comprehensive and pragmatic international refugee resettlement and rights provision system. 
While it certainly has not been a perfect system, it demonstrates an operationalization of the 
greater international refugee rights regime (and the problems that can arise out of that). 
The Nationalist-Populist Threat 
 A Nationalist Resurgence 
 While there do exist left-wing brands of populism such as that exemplified former 
U.S. Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, or even the Syriza party in Greece, there has 
been a considerable rise in popularity and vocalization of right-wing populism in recent 
years. In the United States and Europe alike, this brand of populism has targeted immigrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers, and the general cultural and political “Other.” I utilize an expanded 
version of the definition of populism provided by Cas Mudde in “The Populist Zeitgeist” 
(2004). In this, Mudde describes populism as “an ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus 
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people” (543). I expand on this to not just include the corrupt 
elite, but also those others that are deemed as being the impure people of a society. 
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Furthermore, the concept of a combined “populist-nationalism” equates to populism as a 
subset of a broader nationalist ideology (López-Alves 2018, 22).  
Immigrants have often been the scapegoat of choice for populists. It has not always 
been immigrants of color that are targeted by populists; in the mid-1800s Irish refugees were 
deemed an undesirable populace. Anti-German sentiment escalated dramatically with the 
beginning of World War I. In the 21st century, however, the anti-immigrant focus has been 
on Muslims (regardless of country of origin), asylum seekers, refugees, and other migrants 
from Central America, parts of Africa, and parts of the Middle East, all of which are groups 
for which NGOs have recently sought to provide services and to defend from various human 
rights abuses. However, what we are witnessing today is a global movement of nations 
closing off both their borders and societies to asylum-seekers and refugees. 
 Two prominent theories have emerged as the frontrunners for an explanation to this 
drastic increase in populism in the past decade. Between the economic insecurity thesis and 
the cultural backlash thesis, support is most evident for the latter. As Norris and Inglehart 
found, this new populism has grown out of a reaction and dissatisfaction to progressive and 
cosmopolitan cultural shifts (2016). This comes largely in the face of a perceived increase in 
immigration, as well as increases in the number of refugees and asylum-seekers entering, or 
attempting to enter, the United States and Europe. Even in the instance of economic 
insecurity, immigrants are blamed for stealing jobs, driving down wages, and increasing 
unemployment, while at the same time draining public welfare programs (Hogan and 
Haltiner 2015). 
 This backlash can be seen in a number of regions around the globe. It is clearly 
evident in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Hungary, and 
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more. It has resulted in human rights abuses, violence, and the rise of xenophobic rhetoric 
towards a variety of peoples. It has justified a resurgence in isolationism, the disregard for 
established international rules and norms, and a dangerous attack on the liberal international 
order that could have harmful repercussions for years to come. This new nationalist shift 
challenges liberalism and neoliberalism in some respects, while reinforcing it in others. 
President Trump, for instance, has continued with neoliberal policies of deregulation, tax cuts 
for the wealthy, etc, within the U.S., while admonishing and threatening free trade and the 
free market internationally. However, this economic duality is not under examination in this 
paper. Rather, it is the antagonistic challenge to political and human rights that these 
populist-nationalist governments and parties are enacting. As such, it is important to look at 
the forms of resistance against this nationalist threat. While there are many aspects of civil 
society’s challenge to the populist-nationalist challenge, I find that discussion of NGOs 
provides critical insight into this new shift of resistance. 
 It is important to lay out how the populist-nationalist shift is a systematic one. While 
Chapter 2 will provide a layered analysis of these shifts, here I will explain the various arenas 
that are experiencing changes and challenges in states across the globe. Politically, populist 
nationalism has done increasing damage to democracy and transparency within these states. 
Russian interference in support of the election of President Trump, along with Trump’s own 
willingness to disregard this same interference, has led to a democratic crisis in the United 
States. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has methodically undermined checks and 
balances in the nation, along with centralizing control over the nation’s media, all in an effort 
to cement nationalist control over the state (Kingsley 2018). Culturally, new populist-
nationalist governments have employed rhetoric and values that oppose pluralism and 
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multiculturalism. They have used asylum-seekers and refugees as a means to sow social and 
cultural discord, which in turn provides the governments more opportunity to impose 
restrictive and xenophobic policies in the name of national defense. With respect to 
international law, populist-nationalist governments have ignored human rights requirements, 
the principle of cooperative burden sharing, and have issued policies that have both directly 
and indirectly resulted in protracted human rights abuses. A more detailed accounting of 
these policies and their results is provided in the following chapter, while Chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrate how NGOs and civil society have changed in response to these systematic shifts.  
The Cases of Analysis 
 There are several factors that contribute to the selection of the United States and Italy 
as the case studies for this paper. Both are representative of the greater populist-nationalist 
movement and both feature charismatic demagogues making influential policy decisions. As 
both states have pushed for a retraction from and downgrade of the liberal international 
order, they are prime examples to analyze further. Additionally, NGOs have played 
prominent roles in combating the xenophobic and detrimental policies of these states since 
they came to power. Together, these cases reflect the larger movement of populists in 
downgrading and undermining the liberal international order.  
The United States 
 Donald Trump’s campaign and presidency have operated on populist notions of 
isolationism, restrictive immigration policies, and xenophobia. This has led to several 
humanitarian and human rights abuses, such as the family separation policy at the United 
States-Mexico border. Furthermore, the decision to halt refugee admissions from Syria 
proved a critical blow to civil society operating within the U.S. itself. In general, the Trump 
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administration has completely dismissed and ignored the norms and rules governing the 
international refugee rights regime. 
The Trump administration has threatened the LIO in a host of ways, including the the 
advocacy for other populist candidates and parties in Europe. As a result of these policies, 
many NGOs have had to react and restructure their operations in new ways. NGOs have 
fought back against harmful Trump policies at nearly every turn. This comes in spite of 
budget cuts and drastic reductions in admitted refugees and asylees. Examining these 
responses is critical in understanding the larger dynamics of global civil society attempting to 
uphold the LIO and refugee regime while it is under siege by the larger populist-national 
movement. The larger presence of humanitarian NGOs operating within and out of the 
United States also helps to make this a prime case for the topic of this thesis. 
Italy 
Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini has found 
much inspiration in Donald Trump and his populism, rhetoric, and policies. Salvini has even 
utilized former Chief Strategist for the Trump administration, Steve Bannon, as an advisor 
(Walt 2018). Additionally, Salvini and the League party have adopted a slogan which echoes 
that of the Trump movement, “Italians First.” More crucial, however, are the restrictive and 
abrasive policies and discourse Salvini and the League have implemented in Italy since 
coming to power. Their attacks on Muslims, migrants, and asylum-seekers run parallel to 
those of the Trump administration’s attacks on Syrian refugees and Central American 
asylum-seekers and migrants. At the same time, Italy is in the peculiar position of operating 
under European Union policies alongside national provisions. As I will demonstrate though, 
several of these European Union policies (such as the Dublin Agreement) have actually 
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contributed to the rise of the populist right in Italy and the country’s move towards restrictive 
immigration and asylum policies.  
As a critical entrypoint for asylum-seekers in Europe, Italy has been at the forefront 
of the refugee crisis since 2011. Subsequently, Italy has been a key base for NGOs providing 
aid to new arrivals, be it legal aid, food and shelter, education, and the ever important search 
and rescue missions in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2016, humanitarian NGOs were responsible 
for 26% of all rescues in the Mediterranean. However, since the League administration has 
come into power, NGO operations at sea have been restricted heavily and even criminalized 
for supposedly aiding and abetting human smuggling.  
In summary, the United States and Italy prove to be pivotal cases in studying the 
greater trend moving away from the established liberal international order and towards a 
more nationalist one. Each state has acted to retract from the LIO and establish an isolationist 
form of nationalism with no regard for the tenets founded in the post-WWII international 
system. One of the most critical cases of this comes in the form of their assault on the refugee 
rights regime. As a result, humanitarian NGOs, operating under global civil society, have had 
to restructure, replan, and react to these destructive policies as a way to uphold human rights 
and, ultimately, to try and uphold the liberal international order as best they can.  
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Chapter 2: A Multilayered Challenge 
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched 
refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”    
      - Inscription on the Statue of Liberty 
“States in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They are neither perfectly good 
nor are they controlled by law.” 
- Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter introduced the liberal international order and how civil society 
fits into this order. Also introduced was the rising populist challenge to these spheres. This 
chapter seeks to address two primary questions: How does the liberal international order and 
its refugee rights regime manifest at varying levels? How have recent populist-nationalist 
changes at each level challenged the LIO and the refugee rights regime? These questions 
contextualize the setting in which NGOs must now operate. Along with looking at the 
populist-nationalist movement on a more global level, this chapter demonstrates the various 
nationalist, anti-refugee policies put in place by the new governments in both the United 
States and Italy. These same sections will also show how these policies challenge and 
undermine the liberal international order and the preexisting refugee rights regime in the 
pursuit of a larger nationalist international order. Ultimately, this chapter will set the stage for 
examining how and why humanitarian NGOs have changed in the midst of these nationalist 
challenges.  
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An International Perspective 
 Post-War System 
 While the initial seeds for the liberal international order sprouted after the end of 
World War II, they did not fully take root of the international system until decades later. The 
evolution of the post-war liberal system was elucidated in Chapter 1, and thus this section 
will primarily focus on the growing challenges to this historical system. Immanuel 
Wallerstein argued that the liberal-order had eroded in the 1990s (1993). The principal 
factors Wallerstein cites as challenging the U.S.-led world order originated solely from 
outside the United States itself; the rejection of the world order by states such as Iran, the 
attempts to challenge the military dominance of the “North” by actors such as Saddam 
Hussein, and the large shift of migration from the global South to the global North (5). 
During this same time when the United States’ dominance in the international system was 
declining, the European Union was nearing its cumulative formation and demonstrating a 
continued commitment to the liberal international order. From a U.S.-liberal order 
perspective, Wallerstein was correct that that era was coming to an end. However, it was 
certainly not a global end to liberal values. I contend that this is the case now, however, as a 
truly global shift towards populist-nationalism in place of the liberal international order is in 
mid-swing.  
 Nationalist Shift 
 The rise of right wing, nationalist, illiberal movements is now global. While the 
primary focus in this paper is on the United States and Italy, it is important to discuss here 
how these two cases are part of a much larger trend. The liberal international order is being 
challenged in each quadrasphere of the world. In the United States, Europe, Australia, and 
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Brazil, among many more countries, a specific type of populist-nationalist force has taken 
root. There are similarities in each case: nativism, isolationism, and a discontent with the 
benefits and costs of their respective place in the world order. Strongman politics are 
triumphing, scapegoating others for support of a specific in-group. As Kenneth Roth writes, 
they “treat rights as an impediment to their conception of the majority will, a needless 
obstacle to defending the nation from perceived threats and evils” (2017). For Roth, the 
global rise of populism signals a dangerous challenge to the human rights regime.  
Populism itself is not new, nor does it consist of a singular type. The right-wing, 
authoritarian, often xenophobic populism that I discuss in this paper differs widely from the 
populism that arose in parts of Latin America. It is not a bottom-up movement. Rather, it is a 
movement which claims to represent the “everyday” nationals in a state and utilizes various 
scapegoats as a method to implement restrictionist policies (Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman 
2017). The contemporary populism taking root in the United States, Europe, and several 
other states globally is an exclusionary type, as identified by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013). 
That is to say, while right-wing populists can be seen as politically inclusive due to their 
advocacy of a “silent majority,” they most often promote the exclusion of non-natives as a 
means to solve the political and economic problems of their base (163). 
States are turning inward, even while continuing to manage diplomatic and political 
relations internationally. This comes at a time where global challenges are more dire than 
ever. Climate change, pollution, population increase, substance abuse crises, displaced 
persons - all of these are global issues that require global solutions. States are now rejecting 
their parts in solving these critical collective action problems. As the U.N. Secretary General 
Antonio Guterres stated in a 2018 speech, “Challenges are growing outward, while many 
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people are turning inward. Multilateralism is under fire precisely when we need it most.” 
What does this mean for the international order and the refugee rights regime moving 
forward? I contend that the answer to this question depends on what unfolds within each 
region in the coming years, and the shifting roles of the EU, states, political parties—and 
civil society. 
A European Perspective 
 Post-War System 
 While the European Union did not arise immediately in the aftermath of World War 
II, the foundations of it did, and not merely the principles guiding the creation of the United 
Nations. The economic integrative system that arose in the post-war era continued to expand 
as the decades went on, though this was not necessarily a smooth and linear growth. While 
the historical starting point of the creation of what is now the European Union was 
economically (neo)liberal, the formal creation of the European Union established a more 
interconnected and cooperative political realm of operation. This process brought forth the 
liberal international principles of interdependence. As part of this, and particularly in 
response to the Syrian refugee crisis of 2011, the European Union and its members have had 
this political coordination tested heavily.  
 The decades long process of creating the European Union was both politically and 
economically motivated. Even under the initial formations of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) established by the 1951 Treaty of Paris, the goal was to prevent future 
war through economic integration and diplomatic stability. This trend continued with the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, which turned the ECSC into the European Economic Community 
(EEC). One vital development that occurred during the time of the EEC was the 
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establishment of free movement and flow of goods among member states as part of the 1985 
Schengen Agreement. The Schengen Area has been a key area of disrepute and controversy 
in light of the refugee crisis. After the EEC, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty took the European 
project out of its formal bounds of economic policy and began the process of creating a three-
pillared European Union of economic, foreign, and security policymaking.   
Thomas (2017) identifies four distinct periods of EU membership norms and values: 
from a Europe of non-communist states from 1957 to 1961, to a Europe of non-communist 
parliamentary democracies from 1962 to 1969, to a Europe of liberal democracies from 1970 
to 2005, and to an uncertain Europe thereafter. In spite of a consistent presence of human 
rights requirements in many of the integrative steps the EU took across these periods, 
Thomas argues that membership norms had little to do with respect for human rights (236). 
While Thomas’ claim rests in the evolution of membership norms across the years, Manners 
(2008) insists that human rights have been one of nine normative principles promoted in 
practice by the European Union. These nine principles, including democracy, freedom, and 
social solidarity, and characteristic values of the liberal international order.  
The start of the European process to create distinctive human rights guidelines began 
with the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which followed the post-World War 
II efforts to create an international understanding of human rights obligations. Among its 
eighteen articles include the right to life, the right to freedom from discrimination, and the 
requirement of states to prescribe these rights to everyone under their jurisdiction. Perhaps 
the most important aspect of this convention is the establishment of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which has made judgements on over 20,000 cases, with 40% of these cases 
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concerning Turkey, Italy, and the Russian Federation (“Overview”). This was only the 
beginning of a collective move towards a regional human rights regime.  
When the European Union formally came into being, it created a regional asylum 
framework in order to standardize asylum procedures among member states. The Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) is comprised of a series of Directives and Regulations 
pertaining to the European refugee regime. These include the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
the Reception Conditions Directive and Qualification Directive, the Dublin Regulation, and 
the Eurodac Regulation. The Eurodac Regulation goes hand-in-hand with the Dublin 
Regulation.  
Eurodac established an EU-wide database to hold fingerprint records. These 
fingerprint records are used to determine the party member responsible for examining an 
asylum claim, provided that an applicant attempts to apply in a nation other than the one in 
which their fingerprints are first registered. While the system was originally set up in 2003 to 
only be used for asylum purposes, its mandate has been expanded since then. For instance, 
the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), can now access 
the database to compare fingerprints in criminal investigations. Together, the Asylum 
Procedures, Receptive Conditions, and Qualification Directives detail the full process of and 
standards for the asylum application bureaucratic process. These standards also provide for 
access to safe and reliable living conditions while an application is being processed. 
Additionally, it speaks on the obligatory principle of non-refoulement. Unfortunately, what 
the standards prescribe and how they are implemented have not always been the same since 
the refugee crisis began.  
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One of the most important asylum procedures to analyze is the Dublin Regulation, 
which has gone through three iterations in its lifespan. The first came in 1990, while the 
second and third came in 2003 and 2013. The primary goal of the Regulation is to provide for 
a common set of guidelines among European nations in regard to handling asylum claims. As 
a result, the members would be able to quickly determine which member state is responsible 
for adjudicating an asylum claim. While the Dublin Convention was originally established in 
1990,  it did not come into force until seven years later. The main change that occurred 
between each version was an expansion of membership; the original Dublin Convention had 
only 12 signatories, the subsequent Dublin II and Dublin III Regulations came to include all 
EU members (except Denmark), with additional agreements working to include Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden as well. 
 The core principle of the Dublin Regulation is that the nation responsible for handling 
an asylum claim is the nation in which the asylum applicant first entered. This country is then 
responsible for examining the application. If an applicant applies for a nation in which they 
did not first set foot, they would be returned to the nation in which they first entered the EU 
in order to complete their claim. The necessity for this regulation stems from the EU’s 
Schengen Agreement, which provides for open borders and travel between the majority of 
European Union members. The creation of the Schengen Area was vital in the integrative 
process of the European Union, as open borders fostered interstate travel, commerce, and 
labor between countries. However, the lack of internal borders led to the creation of a 
singular external border for which the EU was now at least partially responsible. The Dublin 
Regulation was supposed to equitably distribute asylum responsibility among member states. 
This was not always equitable, however. 
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With the documented flows of Syrian refugees, the countries most often entered first 
are Greece and Italy. As a result of their geographic location, a disproportionate share of 
bureaucratic burden is placed on their shoulders. In this instance, the outsourcing of refugee 
responsibility is not shifted from the EU to outside countries, but rather it is outsourced 
within its own members. Germany disrupted the Dublin Regulation process in 2015 by 
voluntarily taking in refugees from Italy and Greece, among other countries. The inability to 
effectively coordinate and respond to the increased arrivals of refugees and irregular migrants 
signalled the start of the refugee crisis, also known as the Schengen Crisis, as the Schengen 
Area allowed refugees to move throughout Europe with little formal control. 
Unlike the Eurozone Crisis that began in 2008, the Schengen Crisis marked a shift in 
European identity politics characterized by the rise of right-wing Euroscepticism and the 
issue of border controls. The initiative to establish a “Fortress Europe” became a key policy 
point among those opposed to accepting this new influx of refugees. While the Eurozone 
Crisis resulted in an increased integrative process, the results of the Schengen Crisis have 
downgraded this process and undermined European cohesion (Börzel and Risse 2018). For 
example, the Schengen Crisis was a central factor in the Brexit vote. This came in part from 
the perceived necessity to retake control of the U.K.’s borders, but also due to a perceived 
economic threat. In fact, Great Britain had the fourth highest perception of migrants as a 
socio-economic threat among 47 European countries (Marozzi 2015). 
As the crisis continued, many states began to defect or challenge the European 
Union’s established asylum framework. While there are undoubtedly valid criticisms of the 
system, a variety of state governments and political parties expressed their discontent with a 
more xenophobic and racially charged rhetoric. Several states, such as Hungary, Poland, and 
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now Italy, have taken this rhetoric and turned it into policy, often at the expense of asylum-
seekers. The following section will cover this challenge to the system in more detail.  
Nationalist Shift 
Scholars have written on the rise and (non)threat of European populism long before 
the contemporary refugee crisis began (Ivarsflaten 2007; Rupnick 2007; Oesch 2008). Even 
in the early 2000s many Europeans feared the threats of an Islamization of Europe and being 
left behind by globalization (Moїsi 2007). While formerly the populist focus was on the 
economic liberalism characteristic of the European Union, it has shifted now to border 
security, religion, and cultural grievances. Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, the 
European Union has seen the rise of populist parties in Western Europe. The refugee and 
migration crisis only exacerbated pre-existing worries for Europeans and permitted populists 
to capitalize on these fears.   
 This new trend has created far-right, 
nationalist, populist forces in not only 
Eastern Europe, but Western Europe as 
well. The map adjacent demonstrates the 
widespread support such populist parties 
that press for anti-immigrant policies have 
throughout Europe as of late 2018. These 
parties have been steadily gaining support 
over the past several years, leading up to the 
control of some governments such as Italy. 
Perhaps the most dramatic rises in support have come in Italy, Sweden, and Germany. 
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Populist control in Hungary and Poland is not new, though leaders such as Viktor Orbán of 
Hungary have inspired and allied with populist leaders in Western Europe. In early 2019, the 
new Italian government allied with Orbán’s populist government in Hungary as well as with 
Poland’s populist government to form an “anti-migration front” (Tondo 2018). This illiberal 
shift is distinctively focused on migration and the refugee crisis. This populist front has 
called for a “European Spring” to challenge German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French 
President Emmanuel Macron, whose parties are calling for a stronger and more unified 
European Union at a time where it is being challenged and weakened on multiple fronts 
(Walker 2019). 
 In the case of the United Kingdom, discontent with the European Union, its 
economics, and its refugee and migratory policies led to the pursuit of withdrawal from the 
European Union. Though the process has staggered since it began in mid-2016, the British 
exit from the EU has inspired similar conversations and dissent elsewhere. Only recently did 
the Swedish Democrats remove their call for a Swedish withdrawal from their party platform. 
The League in Italy has claimed they would push for an Italian exit unless there is an 
increase in populist parties within the EU’s government, though Salvini himself has 
contested this. Brexit has shown the consequences of attempting to leave the EU, though 
domestic political challenges are also to blame. At the same time however, grievances 
towards EU policy still exist, and the liberal international/regional order of which it is so 
intricately a part is being undermined.  
How has EU policy failed, though? One could devote an entire paper to analyzing the 
European Union’s entire response to the refugee crisis over the past decade. One critical 
failure was the establishment of the Relocation Programme, created in September of 2015 in 
28 
 
order to ease pressures on Italy and Greece. The Programme was set to relocate 160,000 
asylum seekers. A European Commission report published in May of 2018 revealed that only 
35,000 had been relocated to participating member states (“Relocation of Asylum Seekers”). 
Part of the failure came due to a refusal to accept any refugees by states such as Poland, 
Hungary, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. This failure to equitably relocate refugees 
shows the limits of EU integration and cooperation, a contributing factor in the rise of right-
wing populism and Euroscepticism, particularly in Italy. The May 2019 parliamentary 
elections in the EU proved beneficial to Europe’s populists, and as a a result could effectively 
paralyze further resolutions and changes to resettlement and asylum policy from taking place, 
putting the EU in a deadlock (Traub 2019).  
 The concerns about refugees, security, and migration have all challenged the 
foundational beliefs and hallmarks of European integration. Specifically, these have raised 
questions over the Schengen Zone and freedom of movement between member countries. In 
turn, this crisis has driven increased distrust in Europe’s integrative process and ability to 
successfully mitigate problems (Van Meurs et al 2018, 264). A lack of trust in the EU’s 
liberal institutions has directly contributed to the rise in nationalist and more isolationist 
beliefs. As more populist parties come to power in EU member states, the more its 
institutions will be targeted. While one can only speculate what policy shifts would take 
place in that instance, more restrictive and damaging refugee and asylum policies are likely a 
safe assumption. The challenges to the European Union are a challenge to the liberal 
international order on the whole. The EU is a key site to see the refugee rights regime unfold 
on the ground. This is why it is critical to examine how humanitarian NGOs are working to 
protect refugee rights on the ground, with Italy being a prime case of analysis.  
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An Italian Perspective 
 Post-War System 
The Republic of Italy as we know it today largely came into being as a direct result of 
World War II and its end. As the new liberal international order emerged out of 1945, Italy 
was experiencing several national challenges while also trying to situate itself within the new 
international system. Namely, its economy was in shambles and the country was still divided 
among those who supported Mussolini’s regime and those who opposed it (Andreatta 2001). 
Furthermore, a narrow national referendum abolished the monarchy and the Kingdom of 
Italy, turning it into a democratic, parliamentary republic. 
 Within the post-war international institutions that arose, Italy was a large proponent. 
It has supported the enlargement of NATO, the creation of a more involved, rotating group of 
seats for the United Nations Security Council, and has regularly been the top European 
provider of troops for European peacekeeping missions (Andreatta 2001, 55-56). 
Historically, Italian national law has functioned in line with international treaties and laws. 
Italy has adhered to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ratified the UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Its Constitution also provides for the right of 
individuals to seek asylum. Thus, Italy has also acted to integrate itself legally in compliance 
with the norms and values central to the liberal international order. 
From the beginning of the processes of both international and European integration, 
Italy has been most often a staunch supporter and willing participant. While the nation was 
eager to join the European Union, disagreements among members states about the structure 
of union, issues surrounding fiscal reform necessary to join the single currency market, and 
inconsistent government policies in regard to joining the EU all made for greater discontent 
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with the project (Daniels 1998). Nevertheless, Italy underwent an intensive structural 
adjustment program in order to join the eurozone at its inception, showing a strong desire to 
avoid isolation, economic and otherwise, from the rest of Europe (Mancini 2009). I mention 
all of this to show that Italy in the postwar system has frequently been an advocate for liberal 
international values. This has been promoted further by many of the major Italian politicians 
of the last several decades, namely Romano Prodi, Silvio Berlusconi, and Matteo Renzi, 
though their support was not necessarily without any criticism of liberal international 
institutions.  
 On the other hand, Italian political and economic institutions are quite weak. The 
coalition style of governance in the Italian political system has led to 66 unique governments 
since 1946, or an average of a new government after every year and a month (J.P.P 2013). 
While Italy was successfully integrated into the eurozone at its inception, the Italian economy 
has struggled. In recent years, Italy has possessed the 3rd largest unemployment rate in the 
EU (second only to Greece and Spain), while also experiencing the lowest economic growth 
in all of the eurozone and EU (Cameron 2018). These economic concerns are only part of 
what led to the results of the 2018 Italian general election and the creation of a Eurosceptic 
coalition government between the League party and the Five Star Movement. These 
economic woes, feelings of abandonment by the EU in regard to the recent migrant and 
refugee crisis, and new cultural rifts, have all contributed to the rise in popularity of this 
right-wing, populist coalition which is now challenging the liberal international and 
European orders.  
 While the Five Star Movement is equally a part of the coalition government, the focus 
in this paper is on the leadership and policies spearheaded by the League and its members, 
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particularly Salvini. Both the League and the Five Star Movement can be typed as populist 
and going against the status quo (Ivaldi et al 2017). However, the League is consistently 
more xenophobic and anti-migrant/refugee, thus making it more important for analyzing the 
effects on NGO operations in Italy and the Mediterranean. 
Nationalist Shift 
 The League, formerly referred to as the Northern League, has gone through several 
directional shifts before coming to power in Italy in 2018. The original party name 
established in the late 1980s was actually Northern League for the Independence of Padania, 
advocating for the creation of a separate state in the north of Italy. From its original goal of 
the creation of two independent Italian states, to current criticisms of the European Union, 
the League has been a separatist, populist movement at its very core.  
 Salvini’s leadership of the League has directly echoed the Trump movement in the 
United States. Running on slogans such as Prima gli italiani (Italians First) and Roma 
ladrona (Rome the thief!), across its history the League has distinguished itself as a populist 
movement for both northern Italians and Italy on the whole. While previously the vitriol was 
directed against the elites of Rome, the focus has turned to the elites of Brussels (Brunazzo 
and Gilbert 2017). Salvini’s populist support for Italians comes in contrast to his attacks on 
North African migrants, Syrian refugees, and Muslims in general. Salvini and Trump 
endorsed one another during their respective campaigns, and Salvini has often referred to 
Trump administration policies as an inspiration for his own immigration policy, such as in 
this post on Twitter: “What @POTUS is doing on the other side of the ocean, I'd like it done 
in Italy. An invasion is underway, it needs to be blocked. #Trump.” 
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 The League has made rightful criticism of EU policies towards the Syrian refugee and 
migrants crisis, some of which have left Italy struggling. In spite of recent efforts by the EU 
to better redistribute refugees from Italy, the League and Salvini have decided to close Italian 
ports and borders. While Salvini himself has defended his diatribes as being directed at 
economic migrants, not refugees, the policies his administration has enacted since coming 
into power have shown otherwise. These actions have begun to further dismantle both the 
international and European refugee rights regime. As a result, NGOs operating in Italy and 
the Mediterranean have had to alter their operations in order to protect refugees and save 
lives.  
 Thus far I have only mentioned the rhetoric and ideological backings to the League 
and its policies. Now I move on to answer the real question: how has Salvini and the new 
administration harmed the refugee rights regime? There are several specific instances that 
contribute to a greater movement towards undermining the refugee system, all of which 
occurred during the first year of the administration’s governance.  
 One of the League’s biggest policy moves thus far is the creation of the “Salvini 
decree,” formally known as the Decree-Law on Immigration and Security, which has revoked 
the issuing of humanitarian asylum permits. As part of this, the administration has begun 
closing down asylum reception and processing centers across the country, forcing many into 
homelessness while relocating others with little to no notice or indication of where they will 
be heading (Tondo and Giuffrida 2018a). A particularly striking quote came from a staff 
member who previously worked at an asylum center in Castelnuovo di Porto, Italy’s second 
largest center. The worker stated that “At the end of the day, this shows that in Italy welfare 
is done by citizens, not the government” (Giuffrida 2019b) This statement demonstrates how 
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the importance of civil society and NGOs has grown even further under the League 
administration. 
While Salvini’s concerns over the volume of irregular or illegal migrants into Italy 
can be seen as legitimate, he has shown on multiple occasions that he is not as supportive of 
“real” refugees as he has claimed at times. In October of 2018, Salvini stated that Italy 
“won’t be considered a refugee camp anymore” (“The Latest: Italian Minister”). Like the 
previously cited Tweet, this comment demonstrates that Salvini views refugees in general as 
detrimental and deteriorating to Italy and Italian society. While Salvini has claimed he is 
welcoming of those seeking refuge from war and terror, he has repeatedly taken actions to 
prevent that from happening (Scherer 2018). For example, and as I will discuss in much 
further detail in Chapter 4, Salvini and the League administration have recently blocked 
efforts of humanitarian NGOs to dock in Italian ports after rescuing migrants in the 
Mediterranean.  
Since January of 2018, Syrians account for approximately 9%, or the fourth most 
overall, of all sea arrivals across the Mediterranean. While the overall numbers of Syrian 
arrivals have shrunk in comparison to other Sub-Saharan nationalities, the still substantive 
number of arrivals shows that the central route continues to be a utilized strategy of arrival 
for asylum-seekers. Since the beginning of the Mediterranean crisis, the percentage of those 
dead or missing on the Mediterranean route has actually increased. According to the UNHCR 
Mediterranean Situation Sea Arrivals data, 2015 witnessed the largest number of arrivals at 
just over one million, with 0.36% dead or missing relative to the total number of arrivals. 
That ratio currently sits at 2.4%, the highest it has ever been (“UNHCR Mediterranean 
Situation”). Thus, to close off ports completely and refuse to even process or review potential 
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asylum claims, while at the same time dismissing and attacking NGOs doing this same kind 
of work, is a dangerous venture.  
 These restrictions on NGO vessels also comes as the League administration pursues 
continued relations with Libya and the Libyan coastguard in order to combat boats from 
departing in the first place. The deal made between the Italian government, the EU, and 
Libya to limit Mediterranean crossings came before the League’s rise to governance. This 
agreement enabled the Libyan coastguard to intercept boats and return migrants and potential 
asylum-seekers back to Libya. Were an EU vessel to do the same, it would be in violation of 
the principle of non-refoulement. To return someone to a state where many migrants have 
experienced violence, rape, and torture is in direct violation of international law (Tondo and 
Giuffrida 2018b). Outsourcing the responsibility to Libyan ships has circumvented these 
consequences and the international obligation to protect people from returning to states 
where their lives are in danger. The situation is undoubtedly complex. Part of the reason for 
its inception was the result of the Dublin Regulation and failed Relocation Programme, 
though that does not excuse the violation of international law. Restricting NGO operations at 
sea has only exacerbated the problem. In the following chapters, I will demonstrate how 
NGOs have altered their operations and strategies in protecting human rights in response to 
the populist challenges covered in this chapter.  
A United States Perspective  
Post-War System 
 Chapter 1 touched on the United States’ role in crafting the liberal international order 
and the ways in which the U.S. has also exempted itself from its own creation since the end 
of World War II. From the multipolarity of the war itself, to the bipolar system of the Cold 
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War era, to American hegemony of the late 20th century and early 21st century, the United 
States has been a major power in the international system. Prominent research on the subject 
in recent years has focused on whether or not the “American century” is over, as Joseph Nye 
put it in his 2015 book. Scholarship has focused on the challenge of China to the system and 
whether the liberal order can survive without U.S. hegemony, as well as whether or not 
populism will triumph over globalization (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999; Ikenberry 2008; 
Schweller and Pu 2011; Nye Jr. 2017). Challenges to U.S.-led liberal international order are 
not new by any means. Rising global populism is only one of the newer challenges. Other 
contending factors are the rise of India, China, and Brazil, regional blocs, and alternative 
spheres of influence that exist outside of the West’s liberal international model (Ikenberry 
2011). This decline in U.S. power in the international sphere undoubtedly contributed to the 
resurgence of populist-nationalism and its recent popularity. To “Make America Great 
Again” means to turn back time to the height of American power and the supposed American 
century. 
 Nationalist Shift 
In the buildup to the 2016 Presidential election, the topics of both legal and illegal 
immigration became particularly salient among candidates and the American public alike. A 
2016 study revealed that immigration was considered a “very important” voting factor by 
70% of the electorate. Conversely, past versions of this survey showed that the importance of 
immigration among presidential election voters was only 54% in 2008 and 41% in 2012 
(“2016 Campaign” 34). The debates over immigration and refugees cover a variety of 
questions that include “How many should we let in?”, “What preventative methods should 
we use?”, and “What is the inherent worth of immigrants/refugees?” The answers to each of 
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these are heavily split among partisan lines. This is not just the case in the United States, but 
throughout Europe as well. 
The uptick in importance of immigration comes in the midst of the Syrian refugee 
crisis. The United States’ geographic isolation from the Middle East and Europe has made 
the crisis less present here. Nevertheless, in both Europe and the United States one of the 
most common responses to the Syrian refugee crisis and unauthorized immigration in general 
has been a drastic upsurge in support of right-wing, populist parties. The Trump campaign’s 
forefront slogan of “America First” signalled a supposed rescission from world affairs, 
backing away from the liberal international order in order to prioritize the needs of the 
United States.  
Throughout the presidential campaign and continuing into his presidency, Trump has 
created scapegoats and constructed them as threatening the livelihoods of his base, of “the 
American people.” These scapegoats have come in many forms; Mexican immigrants, 
Muslims, Syrian refugees, Central American asylum seekers. As his presidency has shown, 
this scapegoating has been more than just rhetoric. Trump and his administration have 
systematically attacked these groups and worked to deprive them of rights that are protected 
by international humanitarian agreements and norms. 
Looking back at the Syrian refugee crisis, one of Trump’s first actions in office was 
issuing an executive order effectively banning the admission of refugees from Syria and 
other Muslim-majority countries. While Syrian refugee admissions were to be blocked ad 
infinitum, admissions from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen were suspended for 
an initial period of 90 days. This executive order was forced to go through several iterations 
before being upheld by the Supreme Court in June of 2018, nearly a year and a half after the 
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first version was published. The executive order was rampant with Islamophobia from the 
start, a sentiment much of Trump’s base seemed to reflect. A 2017 study by Baylor 
University revealed that 74% of Trump supporters viewed Islam as a threat, while 81% 
“strongly agreed” that refugees from the Middle East posed a significant terror threat. More 
in tune with Trump’s populism, 72% of his supporters believed that the United States should 
be a “strong Christian nation.” This concoction of beliefs, if held to be true, makes for a 
higher chance of human rights abuses and violations directed at those who practice Islam.  
 The ban violates a host of protections of freedom from discrimination, even United 
States law. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act was explicitly designed with 
establishing a protection from discrimination. As Representative Philip Burton stated to 
Congress during the drafting of this Act, at its core was the effort to “eliminate 
discrimination in immigration to this nation composed of the descendants of immigrants.” 
Furthermore, a federal court ruled that the initial enactments of the travel ban were 
unconstitutional as it discriminates against people based on religion. President Trump’s 
previous remarks against Muslims were cited as evidence in the ruling (Lavoie 2018). A third 
version of the ban, which also restricted travel from Venezuela and North Korea, was 
eventually passed through the Supreme Court with a 5-4 vote. In spite of this, the previous 
versions demonstrate the administration’s carelessness towards violating established human 
rights protections. In mid-2018 this would become abundantly clear with the Trump 
administration’s new policy at the U.S.-Mexico border. 
One of the policies that has received the most backlash under the Trump 
administration is the systematic process of family separation for migrant and asylum-seeking 
families that crossed the southern border. The separations come as part of a “No Tolerance” 
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standpoint on border crossings, meaning that everyone crossing “illegally” will be federally 
prosecuted. During this litigation period, parents and their children have been separated and 
detained in different facilities. A lack of information has led to parents and children not 
knowing where or when they would see one another again. In regard to the policy, former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that “If you cross this border unlawfully, then we will 
prosecute you. It’s that simple” (Jenkins 2018). However, the reality of the situation is far 
from simple. 
The position that the Trump administration is taking is fundamentally saying that 
even asylum seekers crossing the border are breaking the law. In opposition to this claim lies 
a host of international humanitarian provisions. Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights prescribes the right to leave any country, including but not limited to one’s 
own country, and also includes the right to return to one’s own country. Implicit in this 
article is the right to enter a different country from the one an individual is leaving. Of 
course, the United Nations is not advocating here for a global open border policy, but rather 
the inherent right to not be criminalized for seeking refuge in another nation.  
The crux of the issue is the Trump administration’s decision to change the application 
of existing immigration law. The Obama administration also separated families, but this was 
primarily in the instances that officials had reason to doubt the veracity of the familial 
relationship and needed to ensure the child or children were not being trafficked. Previously 
however, there did not exist a separation policy on the scale that the Trump administration is 
currently operating. What has changed is that while families seeking asylum were previously 
released from federal custody and their cases were reviewed in the civil court system, the 
parents are now being detained and prosecuted in criminal courts first while the children are 
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placed into the resettlement process as if they were now unaccompanied minors (Rizzo 
2018).  
This policy has led to a host of human rights violations, particularly of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Articles 7, 8, and 9 protect a child’s right “to know 
and be cared for by his or her parents,” “to preserve his or her identity, including...family 
relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference,” and “to not be separated from 
his or her parents against their will,” respectively. While Article 9 states that children may be 
separated from their parents in exceptional circumstances, they must still be allowed to 
“maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis…,” and 
must also be provided information on the parent’s whereabouts. The Trump administration 
violated these provisions specifically by failing to keep parents and children alike aware of 
one another’s location and situation. Furthermore, the administration failed to reunite 
families in a timely manner, at times deferring to NGOs in order to find missing family 
members, as I will discuss in a later chapter (Pyati 2018).  
While the U.S. signed but did not ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(making it the only United Nations member to not ratify), Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties binds states to “refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty.” Again, while the United States is only a signatory to the 
Vienna Convention, it later admitted that it views the treaty as binding via customary law. 
Additionally, with the Convention on the Rights of the Child having a 99.5% ratification rate 
it is effectively the highest instance of jus cogens, making the United States’ abstention from 
ratification void. 
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 Months after the initial backlash in regard to the family separation policy, the Trump 
administration continued its systematic attacks on migrants and asylum seekers coming from 
the Northern Triangle. Trump has made two key moves in response to one particular migrant 
“caravan” that began their journey northward on October 12th, 2018. This group of migrants 
fled Honduras primarily due to gang violence and significant levels of poverty. The group 
started out with just over one hundred members, but swelled quickly in the days after the 
initial group left El Salvador. As of November the caravan was estimated to contain nearly 
5,000 migrants and asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle, whose stories, needs, and 
reasons for fleeing are by no means uniform (“Migrant Caravan”). 
Throughout the period in which the caravan was in the public spotlight, the common 
thread in the Trump administration’s responses was deterrence. This began with the 
deployment of nearly 7,000 United States troops to the border in order to meet the migrants 
at non-ports of entry (Youssef and Caldwell 2018). The journey to a U.S. port of entry such 
as San Ysidro, California, would lengthen the trip for the caravan, making it more likely that 
many will arrive at the U.S. border in Arizona or Texas. 
The most brash move made by the Trump administration came soon after the asylum-
seeking group began their journey through Mexico. On November 9th, President Trump 
issued a proclamation denying these asylum-seekers the right to enter through non-ports of 
entry in order to establish a claim for asylum. Furthermore, any who cross into the U.S. via 
non-ports of entry are immediately deemed ineligible for asylum, even if they would be 
eligible otherwise. The proclamation also states that a third-country agreement will be sought 
in order to effectively outsource responsibility to Mexico, a move which would not be the 
first in the United States’ immigration policy history. Even during the Obama administration, 
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the government worked with Mexico to stem the flow of immigration from Central America. 
By assisting with Mexico’s own immigration efforts, the U.S. de facto extends its southern 
border to that of Mexico’s own southern border. These are some of the primary efforts that 
the administration has taken to increase deterrence.  
 As a result of these policy overhauls and attacks on refugees and asylum seekers, 
humanitarian NGOs have had to fill in the gaps made by the Trump administration in order to 
best provide services for these individuals. In both the Syrian refugee context and the 
Northern Triangle context, NGOs have come to play critical roles in attempting to ensure that 
human rights and the greater human rights regime prevails. The following chapters will serve 
to demonstrate how NGOs in both the United States and Italy have responded to these 
populist-nationalist challenges in order to uphold the LIO’s refugee rights regime to the best 
of their ability.  
Part of the Trump administration’s reasoning behind its own attacks on the United 
States’ resettlement process is the increasing backlog of asylum applications. Since late 2017, 
the backlog of applications has increased by 26%. A March, 2019 memorandum by the 
Trump administration stated that new changes would be put in place to “strengthen asylum 
procedures to safeguard our system against rampant abuse of our asylum process.” This has 
included the implementation of application fees for both the asylum-seeking process and for 
their work visa application. While the memo did call for existing cases to be settled within 
180 days, on the whole it is only a continuation of the Trump administration’s tactics of 
denying access to the system as much as possible (Kanno-Youngs and Dickerson 2019). 
However, at the same time they are criticizing the backlog, the administration is making 
policy moves that only increase it and slow down processing times. In March of 2019, the 
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Trump administration announced that it would be shutting down all 23 United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services international field offices, which operate across 20 
different countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Among other 
responsibilities these field offices, provide a local point of access for refugee applications and 
family reunification petitions. While USCIS and the Trump administration state that the 
effort will help to decrease the backlog in applications, others are more critical. Sarah Pierce, 
a policy analyst from the Migration Policy Institute, claims that "It's yet another step that 
USCIS has taken that slows the processing of refugee applications and will slow customer 
service in general,” and that a slowdown of processing could lead to more calls for reductions 
in the refugee cap in future years (Romo and Rose 2019). In sum, it creates a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of refugee admissions and bureaucratic slog. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Chapter 3: The NGO Resistance in the United States 
 
“Is the liberal international order dead? No. Is it under threat? Yes. Is it under threat from 
 without as well as within? Yes. Does it need to be fought for? Yes.”  
- David Miliband, President of the International Rescue Committee 
“Of course there are days no migrant dies – and other days when hundreds do.  
Nonetheless, it’s time to stop counting and start changing, beginning with the way we 
manage migration worldwide.”  
- William Lacy Swing, General Director of the International Organization for 
Migration 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapters outlined the context under which humanitarian NGOs are now 
operating, not only globally but within states as well. In the case of the United States, the 
Trump administration has drastically undermined the refugee rights regime. This 
administration has set the lowest refugee admission ceiling and the lowest number of 
refugees admitted in the past 40 years. In 2018 the administration saw the third lowest 
admissions-to-ceiling ratio, ranked only behind the two years following the September 11th, 
2001 attacks (“U.S. Annual Refugee”). Rights are being revoked and responsibilities ignored. 
This chapter is the first of two parts in answering how NGOs have responded to these 
challenges, when they themselves are also being opposed by the Trump administration. 
Additionally, this chapter seeks to address how these changes in NGOs are affecting the 
broader dynamics of civil society at large in the 21st century.  
NGOs in U.S. History 
The existence of non-governmental organizations dates back to as late as the 18th 
century. In the United States, one of the earliest humanitarian NGOs was the Pennsylvania 
Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, which was founded in 1775 (Charnovitz 
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1996, 191). While there is much debate as to when the modern era of (I)NGOs began, one of 
the simplest starting points would be 1945. It was in this year that the United Nations was 
founded. Article 71 of the UN Charter formally provided for cooperation and consultation 
between the UN and non-governmental organizations. This article explicitly validated the 
role of these organizations around the world as an important part of civil society. Operating 
in this system, NGOs can play a unique role as “the closest approximation to direct popular 
participation in the intergovernmental machinery” (“General Review”). Since their 
formalization in the international system, NGOs have been at the forefront of combating 
human rights abuse, providing aid to those in emergencies, and raising awareness of the 
abuses around the globe. These operations remain the core pillars of humanitarian NGO work 
today. 
Towards the end of the 20th century, NGOs began to put an increasing amount of 
resources and effort into advocacy. By 2000, the number of NGOs that recognized advocacy 
as a key endeavor in pursuit of their objectives, the more directed attention given to advocacy 
programs, and the increase in NGO leadership specializing in advocacy all demonstrated an 
“increased strategic priority to be given to advocacy” (Anderson 2000, 449). The focus 
became a normative one: to raise awareness of certain issues, admonish rights abusers, and 
promote humane solutions. In this respect, NGOs have largely been rights promoters since 
the 1990s and early 2000s. Historically, NGOs  have endorsed liberal values through 
informal methods of condemnation and repercussions.  
NGOs have been the bearers of transnational civic identities within global 
governance. They themselves are shifting their roles within the global order as part of their 
reactions to these migration and humanitarian crises. While previously the power of NGOs 
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has been discursive and normative, this power dynamic is now shifting to one where NGOs 
are actively providing services and rights alongside their advocacy and norm promotion. 
However, these actions themselves are a form of advocacy and norm promotion. In sum, 
there is a shift occurring within the core of civil society.  
NGOs also serve their role as advocates by amplifying domestic claims and 
pressuring foreign states and IGOs to take action (Keck and Sikkink 2014). Humanitarian 
NGOs will often act to make sure the promotion of and agreement to human rights provisions 
is more than mere lip service. Previously, the power of NGOs stemmed primarily “from the 
ability to highlight deviations from deeply held norms of appropriate behavior” (Snyder 
2009). These actions by humanitarian organizations reflect an internalization of the very 
norms themselves, and in turn their promotion helps to serve a greater acceptance of these 
norms as binding. In spite of the desire by many for NGOs to remain apolitical, this form of 
“socialization” in which civil society organizations pressure states to protect and enforce 
human rights practices is inherently political (Risse and Sikkink 1999).  
The Trump administration, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, has posed a grave threat to 
the liberal international order and to liberal values within the United States itself. This 
administration has systematically undermined the refugee rights regime, targeting the most 
vulnerable populations, increasing bureaucratic slowdown, revoking asylum rights, and 
attacking humanitarian NGOs attempting to protect human rights. As a result, NGOs 
operating within the United States have responded in a variety of ways in order to protect 
themselves, liberal values, and refugees and asylum-seekers.  
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NGOs and the U.S. Nationalist Challenge 
 I identify one major shift and three minor shifts in NGO operations that have come 
out of this nationalist challenge to the liberal international order and the human rights regime. 
First and foremost, NGOs have begun to fill operational human and refugee rights gaps 
created directly by the Trump administration on a scale that has not been experienced before. 
Second, and in line with point one, many NGOs have found themselves in the position of 
becoming more politically charged. Third, NGOs have come to utilize technology and social 
media as a means to promote and provide rights to a variety of vulnerable groups. Fourth, as 
transparency and communication with the Trump administration on major policy decisions 
has been void, NGOs have experienced drastic and sudden shifts in operations, causing many 
to operate on a more reactive basis and threatening many rights programs. 
Filling in the Gaps 
In a direct signal towards the new and evolving role of NGOs acting under populists, 
Justice Department lawyers submitted a filing in August calling for the American Civil 
Liberties Union to use its “considerable resources” in order to locate parents that the Trump 
administration deported prematurely and prior to being united with their family. While the 
ACLU acknowledged that the organization would undoubtedly help to aid the families that 
have been separated, it is not their responsibility alone, as the United States government must 
be the one to undo their own mistake. Furthermore, the ACLU addressed the crux of the issue 
with the following statement in court: “the United States Government has far more resources 
than any group of NGOs (no matter how many NGOs and law firms are willing to try to 
help)” (Schmidt 2018).  
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The obstinacy of governments to use their own resources in order to fix their own 
abuses is an affront to basic human decency and responsibility. Even if the NGOs do act to 
reconnect families, it is not their sole responsibility to take on. As the lead ACLU lawyer 
stated in the case against the administration, “The ACLU, private firms, and NGOs are 
largely doing what the government should be doing. Is that ideal for all of us? No. Is it 
necessary? Yes” (Semple and Jordan 2018). This is where the current dynamic stands; NGOs 
are filling the fulfillment gaps where the United States government has created them and 
where the U.S. should be filling the gaps itself. This includes, among others, the provision of 
legal representation for asylum-seekers. As it stands, immigration courts in the United States 
do not guarantee the right to free legal counsel. Thus remains two options for asylum-
seekers: pay for a lawyer out-of-pocket, or rely upon legal counsel from humanitarian NGOs 
and other legal organizations offering their services. While this aspect of the courts are not 
new, the recent increase in the number of asylum-seekers, combined with the new and 
restrictive policies put in place by the Trump administration, means that more of the 
responsibility will fall onto the shoulders of humanitarian NGOs.  
These humanitarian organizations have not only filled in the United States’ gaps at 
home, but abroad as well. There has been an increased presence of NGOs in the Northern 
Triangle, working with IGOs such as the United Nations Refugee Agency and the 
International Organization for Migration in order to alleviate some of the harmful conditions 
in these countries (Lieberman 2018). NGOs such as the International Rescue Committee 
have been aiding those internally displaced with cash assistance, emergency housing 
assistance, and increasing access to quality healthcare and nutrition services. Long-term aid 
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and support to these regions are critical efforts to promote long-term stability and help these 
countries create safe environments from which people will not have to leave.  
In October of 2018, President Trump posted on Twitter that the United States would 
be cutting foreign aid to development programs in the Northern Triangle:  
“Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador were not able to do the job of stopping people 
from leaving their country and coming illegally to the U.S. We will now begin cutting 
off, or substantially reducing, the massive foreign aid routinely given to them.” 
 While this Tweet was taken as only a threat, at the end of March 2019, the Trump 
administration announced they would be cutting all direct aid to Honduras, Guatemala, and 
El Salvador. This includes aid for programs working to reduce gang violence, which is one of 
the foremost catalysts of asylum-seekers coming to the United States (Rogers et al 2019). 
Long term aid is vital in addressing the root causes of the migration of asylum-seekers to the 
United States. To rescind aid while simultaneously attacking those seeking refuge in the U.S. 
is both hypocritical and self-defeating. While analyzing the effectiveness of aid programs is 
understandable for any government, a complete abrogation of funding is a drastic step that 
can only lead to dire and negative consequences. From the creation of a border wall, to 
family separation, to the administration’s “Zero Tolerance” policy on border crossings, and 
now to potential cuts in aid, President Trump and his administration have shown that they 
have no desire to address the catalysts of asylum-seeking itself, merely entrance of asylum-
seekers into the United States. While the U.S. is certainly not the only contributor of aid to 
the region, its absence would leave a large hole in the funding. This leaves INGOs in a 
precarious position.  
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 Not only are NGOs filling in gaps within the United States as well as at the border to 
aid those from the Northern Triangle, but local and international NGOs alike are filling new 
and old gaps to help reduce the drivers of asylum-seekers and migrants from the region. 
NGOs such as Save the Children, the Red Cross, and the International Rescue Committee 
continue to operate on both fronts in order to continue fighting for human rights in spite of 
the Trump administration’s blatant disregard for both the refugee rights regime and the 
provision of a sustainable, long term solution to the crisis. The actions of these NGOs in 
contrast the Trump administration’s own shows that NGOs are vital to upholding the refugee 
rights regime and the values of the liberal international order, particularly in this time of 
global, populist challenges to the LIO. 
 In response to the groups of asylum-seekers coming to the United States from the 
Northern Triangle, also known as “migrant caravans,” many NGOs mobilized to prepare for 
the new arrivals and provide aid where necessary. The Trump administration’s “Zero 
Tolerance” policy made it clear that when these individuals arrived at the U.S.-Mexico 
border, they would likely need legal aid. One organization, the Kino Border Initiative, has 
worked to provide adequate food and shelter for new arrivals waiting to begin the asylum 
process in the United States. NGOs like the Kino Border Initiative have worked to protect the 
rights of migrants and ensure that lack of water, shelter, or healthcare does not dissuade or 
affect their pursuit of asylum (Turnbull 2018).   
As a result of the family separation policy changing detention policies at the border, 
as well as a demographic shift in those coming from the Northern Triangle, some NGOs have 
had to rework their approach to helping asylum-seekers. Data have shown that there is an 
increasing number of women and children asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle in 
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recent years. The journey alone leaves these individuals particularly vulnerable to further 
violence and sexual trafficking. Government reception centers and medical staff are often ill-
equipped to handle helping those deeply traumatized by the journey, and thus NGOs such as 
Save the Children must fill in the gap with specialized mental health resources and staff 
(Welsh 2018). 
Some organizations have relied on new partnerships in order to resist policies and 
provide support to asylum-seekers in more than just rhetoric. One example of this is Save the 
Children’s response to the family separation policy at the U.S.-Mexico border. While the 
organization’s primary focus has been addressing the root causes of the crisis within the 
Northern Triangle, it has partnered with the American Immigration Council and Kids in Need 
of Defense (KIND) to create a stronger support network. This partnership would enable for 
greater provision of legal aid, resources, and family reunification (“Save the Children 
Announces”). This is a trend that is seen in both the United States and in the Italian case. 
While NGO partnerships are not a new endeavor, there has been an increased need for cross-
NGO cooperation and support in order to better resist illiberal, xenophobic policies and to 
better protect the human and refugee rights regimes.  
The Political Push 
One NGO in particular has become a de-facto leader in the resistance against the 
Trump administration, reinventing itself in the process. While government contracted 
resettlement organizations such as the IRC, HIAS, and the Church World Service have 
suffered financially due to the restrictive refugee policy implemented by the Trump 
administration, the American Civil Liberties Union has not. Conversely, the ACLU saw 
donations increase dramatically following the election of Donald Trump in 2016. In the first 
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two years after the election, public memberships in the organization grew from 400,000 to 
nearly 2 million. In the three years prior to the election, the ACLU earned approximately $4 
million per year in public donations. After Trump’s election, that annual figure has increased 
to nearly $120 million (Zhao 2018).  
The ACLU has pushed itself into the American political sphere as a direct result of 
the Trump administration’s attack on liberal values and human rights. Since the early 1900s, 
the ACLU’s primary focus has been on policy challenges in court. The drastic increase in 
funding has enabled the organization to make this shift away from the courtroom and towards 
a more public, grassroots style of mobilization and campaigning. While formerly, the 
ACLU’s value of staying nonpartisan meant staying apolitical as well, they have taken a shift 
in this stance. Their newfound political role comes through educating voters on civil liberties 
and human rights records of all candidates, detailing the consequences of specific elections, 
and mobilizing voters. As the Executive Director, Anthony Romero, stated, the goal is to 
empower individual members of civil society and “give people a real opportunity to be 
protagonists” (Wallace-Wells 2018). 
 The International Rescue Committee has also pushed itself into new political 
territory. In January of 2017, the organization launched a fundraiser with the goal of raising 
$5 million to respond to the needs of refugees in the United States. This came in a direct 
response to the Trump administration’s announcement of the Muslim ban. The IRC stated 
that it was the first time the organization had ever had to issue an emergency appeal to help 
refugees already in the United States. Part of the funding goal was to help fill in the funding 
gap that would be created by the Trump administration’s drastic reduction in admissions, but 
the funds would also enable the IRC to fight back against the ban itself (Stack 2017). 
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 NGOs have become increasingly involved in directly challenging the Trump 
administration’s human rights abuses and restrictive policies. At nearly every step, NGOs 
have issued legal challenges to these anti-refugee and anti-asylum seeker policies. While the 
ACLU has been involved in several of these, they are not the only ones. Smaller 
organizations such as Al Otro Lado and the Border Network for Human Rights have been 
involved in other legal and political challenges to the Trump administration’s attacks on the 
refugee rights regimes. This signals a new trend in NGOs not just advocating against 
nationalist anti-refugee policies, but being fully committed to contesting them in multiple 
avenues. While these lawsuits focused on the violation of U.S. asylum and rights laws, they 
nonetheless represent the pursuit of upholding the highest standards of international human 
rights laws and norms. In this way, the increasing shift towards NGOs operating on a legal 
and political basis represents a larger commitment to upholding the liberal international order 
against nationalist challenges.  
A Technological and Reactive Shift 
Apart from the standard emergency aid and economic development programs, some 
agencies have become more innovative in reaching people affected by the violent conditions 
in the Northern Triangle. In the case of the IRC, the organization recently released an online 
information service called CuéntaNos.org (in English, “Tell us”), which provides a detailed 
map of El Salvador showing locations to receive legal aid, healthcare, shelter, education, and 
employment and work programs. This comes as part of a larger collaborative initiative with 
Mercy Corps and Peace Geeks called Signpost. Together the three NGOs have created sites 
similar to CuéntaNos.org in order to provide information for refugees, asylum seekers, and 
migrants in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Serbia, and Italy. These sites allow the 
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aforementioned groups to be connected with services of which they otherwise would be 
unaware. Signpost Projects demonstrates how innovative some NGOs have had to become in 
response to these global problems; they have become advocates, information providers, and 
service providers abroad, filling the humanitarian fulfillment gaps wherever possible.  
In order to help the mental health of refugees and aid workers alike, the NGO Field 
Innovation Team partnered with a Silicon Valley tech company to create and implement a 
program called Karim. Karim is an artificially intelligent online bot that uses natural 
language processing in order to provide mental health support conversations to Arabic 
speaking refugees within the United States and to those displaced in the Middle East, who 
may not have ready or affordable access to mental health professionals (Paul et al. 2018, 22). 
There is a growing trend of NGOs utilizing technology as a means to expand 
advocacy programs, reach more individuals in need, and come up with new ways to protect 
vulnerable populations. The 2018 Global NGO Technology Report, which surveyed over 
5,000 NGOs across 164 countries, found that NGOs are rapidly increasing their use of 
technology and social media. While this is not a direct response to growing nationalism, it 
permits NGOs to protect and advocate for human rights in new ways, as Chapter 4 will show 
as well. It shows a continued commitment to supporting refugees and refugee rights no 
matter the political context. While these innovations were not a reaction to the Trump 
administration, many operational shifts have been.  
The immediate result of the 2017 executive order banning refugees from several 
Muslim-majority states in the Middle East was chaos and confusion at airports across the 
U.S. as airport authorities began detaining new arrivals who were already granted refugee 
status and/or green cards. It became readily apparent that this was the desired effect for the 
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Trump administration, as the President himself stated one day after the ban took place that 
“It’s working out very nicely. You see it at the airports, you see it all over” (Dehghan et al 
2017). Of course, the ban affected many more than just those detained at U.S. airports. The 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, an international NGO primarily known today as HIAS, 
reported that 2,000 people were set to be rescheduled the week after the travel ban went into 
effect.  
As a result of policies such as this, many NGOs have had to operate on a more 
reactive basis. As one pro-immigrant advocacy leader stated, “From an advocacy standpoint, 
it’s a different world we’re in than just a couple years ago. Now we’re playing a lot more 
defense on all sorts of different fronts” (Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2018, 93). In the 
instance of the travel ban, many international NGOs such as CARE, Relief International, and 
Mercy Corps, all of whom provide emergency humanitarian assistance to those in need, have 
had to restructure their assistance strategies and reassign their workers to different locations. 
Early on, CARE expected that the ban would affect at least 300 of its U.S. staff members, as 
it would impact their ability to travel to and return from the fragile countries in which they 
operate, including 5 of the 7 countries listed on the initial ban (Lieberman 2017). These types 
of measures can greatly limit the full utilization of an NGO’s tools; if an NGO is not able to 
gain access to an emergency, then its resources are effectively nullified.  
While it is certainly not the case that only U.S. based NGO workers would be the 
ones to potentially provide aid to a disaster or other humanitarian need, this type of policy by 
the Trump administration has the potential to exacerbate existing disaster conditions by 
hindering relief availability. A spokesperson for Mercy Corps confirmed that the process of 
responding to humanitarian emergencies has become more complex due to the ban, stating 
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that the organization now needs to “weigh an additional factor — the aid worker's nationality 
— in addition to experience, technical skills, languages the person speaks and all the other 
things that come into consideration” (Lieberman 2017). In the worst case scenarios, 
operational convolution such as this can result in the creation of even more displaced 
persons—which the current U.S. administration clearly does not want to accept, and/or a 
higher death count as a result of the disaster and its aftereffects.  
Travel is not the only factor augmented by the administration’s policies that is 
making NGO operations more 
complex. Due to the drastic 
decrease in admissions of 
refugees and asylum seekers, 
many NGOs have had to close 
offices, lay off workers, or 
rework existing programs and 
services. The administration’s 
decision to cap refugee intakes at 45,000 per year (as opposed to President Obama’s cap of 
110,000) marks the lowest admissions ceiling since the creation of the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program in 1980 (Gomez 2018). As government funding for resettlement is tied 
to admission numbers, the nine voluntary agencies which the government contracts to aid in 
the resettlement process have received extensive budget cuts. 
The San Diego, California branch of the International Rescue Committee had to 
layoff 15 workers due to budget cuts, as well as switch their English as a foreign language 
courses to be run by volunteers or interns only, as they simply could not afford the upkeep 
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anymore. Church World Service, another voluntary resettlement agency, had to layoff over 
one hundred workers while closing offices and having to merge operations with other NGOs. 
World Relief laid off 140 employees and closed 5 offices nationwide as a result of dwindling 
refugee admissions (Mento 2018).  
Due to these changes, many NGOs have had to shift their focus towards representing 
other types of immigrants in federal court and immigration proceedings. This is all part of a 
much wider undermining of the refugee rights and resettlement regime within the United 
States by the Trump administration. As NGO resources are stretched thin after these closures 
and dismissals, the bureaucratic machinery of resettlement becomes clogged, slowing the 
process further. Ryan Crocker, the Former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, has stated 
that these policies are a “strategic…[and] conscious effort to deconstruct the [refugee] 
system” (Amos 2018). When the time comes for the refugee admissions cap to be raised 
again, the system as it is now will be strained to mobilize and resettle new arrivals. As I 
propose in Chapter 5, greater contingency plans need to be established by NGOs in order to 
prepare for this possibility, along with other potentially damaging policies by the Trump 
administration that could arise in the finals years of his presidency. 
Conclusion 
 As this chapter demonstrated, NGOs have been forced to adjust their own operations 
and responsibilities in response to the Trump administration’s attacks on liberal values and 
the refugee rights regime. While many NGOs have had to fill in the rights fulfillment gap by 
providing services and resources to asylum-seekers and refugees, they continue to be strong 
advocates for human rights. NGOs have become the defenders of the liberal international 
order by continuing to provide rights and push for the upholding of liberal values, even when 
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being challenged and undermined themselves by the Trump administration. As the next 
chapter will show, this finding becomes even more clear when comparing efforts of U.S. 
NGOs to those in Italy.  
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Chapter 4: The NGO Resistance in Italy 
“We have a duty toward our brothers and sisters who, for various reasons, have been forced  
to leave their homeland: a duty of justice, of civility and of solidarity.”  
- Pope Francis 
“The problem is to block an organised invasion that is producing the ethnic cleansing of 
Italians and Europeans. In a year we'll be talking about hundreds of thousands of people 
arriving."  
- Matteo Salvini, Minister of Interior 
 
Introduction 
 As in chapter 3, this chapter seeks to answer similar questions to those addressed in 
Chapter 3. First, how have populist, anti-refugee and anti-migrant policies affected the 
operations of NGOs? Second, why are NGOs being targeted in this case? Third, how have 
NGOs responded and reorganized in response to these challenges? Last, what do these 
responses mean for the liberal international order and refugee rights regime? 
NGOs operating in Italy and the Mediterranean are a unique case for a number of 
reasons. Much of their newfound role came at the start of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015. 
The number of NGO search and rescue (SAR) boats increased drastically, and for a time 
NGOs led all parties in terms of number of individuals rescued at sea, reflecting a large shift 
in civil society as rights providers and protectors. These changes came years before Salvini 
and the League administration came to power. What is interesting about the Italian case now 
is that these new roles are being staunchly challenged and undermined by the League 
administration.  
  Whereas in the United States case many anti-refugee policies indirectly, though 
greatly, affect the operations of NGOs, the Italian case sees policies directly attacking NGOs 
that save lives at sea. These policies have had adverse results on a variety of elements 
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pertaining to the crisis, from an increase of deaths at sea, to a collapse of the integration 
system within Italy itself, to the criminalization of search and rescue, to a continued 
“shrinking space” of civility in the nation. The Italian case is important because the 
challenges to NGOs are so extreme. When compared to the case of NGOs in the United 
States, we begin to discern how, in similar yet differing environments, NGOs have attempted 
to uphold the refugee rights regime against the undermining of populist nationalism. This 
comparison reveals what more can be done by NGOs in either case, and how policies need to 
change. I answer this latter question in the following chapter.  
NGOs in Italian History 
 The roots of civil society in Italy can be traced back to the 14th century development 
of civism and humanism (Muir 1999). What we view now as modern civil society and non-
governmental organizations did not come to flourish until the 1990s, where civil society 
protests broke out against former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s control of Italian media 
(Ginsborg 2013). This recent rise, in part, has contributed to a lack of formal research done 
on NGOs in Italy. Historically, the Italian government has had a limited conception and 
formal recognition of civil society and various NGOs. 
In general, the Italian government has a more restrictive definition of what constitutes 
an NGO. Namely, and I argue that this changed in practice in 2015, NGOs recognized by the 
state were those dedicated to operational development overseas, not civil projects in Italy. To 
be formally recognized by the state and eligible for federal funding, these organizations had 
to register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under a law implemented in 1987 (“Law 
49/87”). Recently, the number of NGOs recognized by the state marked just over 230. This is 
in contrast to the thousands of local and national NGOs working solely in Italy, and primarily 
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as advocacy NGOs (“Italian NGOs”). The debates over search and rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean have brought NGOs, whether formally recognized by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or not, into the spotlight. Regardless of existing distinctions between the various 
organizations that operate SARs at sea, they have nonetheless been categorized rhetorically 
into the conceptualization of NGOs by the Italian government and in the public’s eye.  
 NGOs in Italy, like those in the United States, have integrated the values promoted by 
the liberal international order. The largest NGO collective in Italy is the Association of 
Italian organizations for international cooperation and solidarity (AOI), which has 
transnational development as its central focus. Additionally, it was built upon and continues 
to promote the values of pluralism, democracy, human rights, common goods, and mutual 
accountability, all tenets for which states in the liberal international order advocated post-
World War II. Even prior to the election of the League administration, Italian NGOs 
consistently reiterated their defense of human rights and liberal values in the face of 
opposition in Italy, the EU, and around the globe. Events such as the “Stand Up for Human 
Rights, Side by Side with NGOs” gathering of leading NGOs in Rome signals the partnership 
among NGOs in defending the liberal international order against rising populist, nationalist 
challengers in a variety of arenas (Fusco 2018). 
 In April 2015, a boat carrying migrants across the Mediterranean to Italy collapsed, 
resulting in the deaths of over 800 people, many of whom were from Syria. This collapse and  
several others that took place soon after, are generally agreed upon to have marked the 
beginning of the refugee crisis in Europe (“Mediterranean Crisis 2015”). Furthermore, they 
sparked the focus on SAR operations in the Mediterranean conducted by state, European, and 
eventually NGO operations alike. As a result of this shift, state reference to NGOs came to 
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include humanitarian organizations aiding migrants who have arrived in Italy as well as those 
who began to conduct rescue operations at sea, even if these organizations were not 
necessarily involved in transnational development, as was the original defining factor. 
NGOs and the Italian Populist Challenge 
 Throughout the entirety of the refugee and migrant crisis, local and international 
nongovernmental organizations have acted in order to provide aid and basic services to those 
arriving that are in need. Since 2015 especially, a year which witnessed a near 400% increase 
in the number of deaths of people attempting to cross the Mediterranean, NGOs have been 
key actors in rescuing people at sea, as the chart adjacent using data from the Italian Coast 
Guard demonstrates. Be it by rescuing those lost at sea or providing legal services to those 
that are newly arrived, NGOs have been at the forefront of this crisis from the beginning. 
Many, such as Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, see this as precisely the problem. 
Since the League administration came into governance, there have been two main efforts that 
have directly altered the humanitarian operations of NGOs working in and with Italy, as well 
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as several other policies that have drastically damaged the human rights regime. As a result, 
NGOs have been left to not only fill in service provision gaps, but to continue to advocate for 
upholding human rights norms and liberal values in the face of a government that openly 
ignores these tenets and standards.  
What is happening to NGOs in Italy is representative of a much larger problem facing 
the globe; the Italian case is only more visible and extreme currently. Throughout the 
European Union, NGOs are being subject to an increasingly “shrinking space” in which these 
organizations can navigate. That is to say, “the layer between state, business, and family in 
which citizens organise, debate and act seems to be structurally and purposefully squeezed in 
a very large number of countries” (Buyse 2018). This is not necessarily a uniquely new 
phenomenon, nor is it exclusively caused by populism. Though in recent years it has 
predominantly been countries in Eastern Europe that have been criticized most for their 
attacks on humanitarian workers and NGOs. 
 The trends identified in this chapter are not as strong as those witnessed in the United 
States case, though I believe they are precursors of things to come. Nevertheless, I identify 
three initial shifts and operational responses taking place in order to protect asylum and 
human rights in spite of the League administration’s drastic rights rescissions. First, NGOs 
have begun a practice of working around or directly disobeying new laws imposed by the 
League. Second, while NGOs are attempting to fulfill rights provisions gaps on the ground, 
these nationalist policies and rhetorical attacks are forcing NGOs operating in Italy into a 
defensive posture. Third, like in the United States, new technological initiatives have enabled 
a way for NGOs to survive this new nationalist environment while under the threat of an 
ever-shrinking space for civil society. 
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 Obedience and Disobedience 
One remarkable case of resistance to the League administration’s block on NGO SAR 
ships docking in Italian ports is the creation of an operation called “Mediterranea.” This 
effort is comprised of members and organizations from various parts of civil society, 
including the NGOs Sea Watch and Open Arms. It is self-described as “a non-governmental 
action of moral disobedience and civil obedience…” (Martucci Schiavi 2018). A press 
release by the leaders of the operations explains this further, stating that: 
We will disobey nationalism and xenophobia. Instead we will obey our constitution, 
international law and the law of the sea, which includes saving lives. 
Mediterranea presents a unique partnership between NGO operations with 
governmental aid as a means to subvert the League’s illiberal, anti-NGO policies. The 
hallmark of Mediterranea is the ship Mare Jonio (also called Mare Ionio), which was bought 
and equipped by a coalition of left-wing Italian politicians, anti-racist associations, and 
university professors, and then subsequently placed under the supervision of two 
humanitarian NGOs. The ship was able to avoid the blockade on NGO SAR ships operating 
out of and docking in Italy by flying the Italian flag (Martucci Schiavi 2018). Since the ship 
is officially an Italian vessel, under the new decree it is able to dock. Mare Ionio first 
departed from Italy in October of 2018. 
Five months later, in March of 2019, Mare Ionio was seized after rescuing 49 asylum 
seekers who were at sea for over two days. It was permitted to dock in the small Italian isle 
of Lampedusa before being accused by Minister Salvini of aiding and abetting illegal 
migration (Tondo 2018). In spite of supposedly being illegal migration, the 49 migrants are 
all expected to begin the refugee application process in Lampedusa. According to 
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Mediterranea spokesperson Alessandra Sciurba, “As far as we are concerned, there are the 
rights of people, international law, human rights, international conventions” (“Mare Ionio 
Migrants”). It is clear that with this example, the tenets of the liberal international order, 
along with the values and norms set out in the international refugee rights regime, directly 
influenced the actions of these various civil society members in opposing the League 
administration’s repressive policy. 
The partnership that created Mediterranea represents a greater movement of 
cooperation and alliance between NGOs themselves. Additionally, NGOs and mayors in Italy 
have shown a newfound partnership of resistance against Salvini and the League 
administration. One other key example of this increased solidarity came when Italy refused to 
allow the Sea-Watch 3 SAR ship, operated by the German based NGO Sea Watch, dock after 
having rescued 32 migrants at sea. During the Sea-Watch 3’s two-week gridlock at sea, 
nearly a dozen mayors across Italy notified the ship that they would stand in solidarity with 
the NGO and welcome the migrants if it were to dock in their city (“Italian Mayors Rebel”). 
Salvini rebuked the mayors’ offers, stating that if they followed through they would “answer 
for their actions before the law and the history books” (Balmer 2019). In many ways, this 
new resistance parallels the existence of sanctuary cities within the United States. These 
cities limit their cooperation with the federal government and its immigration enforcement 
bodies in order to provide relative safety to undocumented immigrants, refugees, and asylum-
seekers. Oftentimes these cities contain NGOs providing safe access to legal resources.  In 
both the U.S. and Italian context, NGOs become linked to local level resistance to national 
anti-immigrant policies.  
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In Migrazione, a local Italian NGO, has sought to improve the integration of asylum-
seekers and refugees into Italian society in spite of the increasing hostility towards them, 
especially by Salvini and the League administration. Others like In Migrazione have 
responded to the hostility by becoming the force which seeks to integrate individuals into 
Italian society and bridge the gap between this group of people, portrayed as a threatening 
and unruly “other” by the League administration, and Italian citizens (Riegert 2018). In 
response to the Salvini Decree, In Migrazione created a project called UMANItalia, a play on 
words of “humans” and “Italy.” This project aims to provide housing and food to those 
directly affected by the Decree and the subsequent closing of asylum shelters around the 
nation. UMANItalia reveals the extent to which NGOs have come to fill the fulfillment gap 
left open by the Italian government. Furthermore, and particularly revealing, the project 
directly echoes the motto of Mediterranea, asserting that the project is a practice of 
disobedience towards these restrictive and harmful policies while in defense of the human 
rights of access to shelter, food, and medicine.  
Perhaps the most direct signal of “civil obedience, more disobedience” came in 
March of 2019, when over 200,000 protesters marched in Milan against the illiberal, 
nationalist, and xenophobic policies of Italy’s new government. This movement was 
orchestrated by a group of six rights-based NGOs and was supported by the mayor of Milan, 
Giuseppe Sala, who is one of several prominent mayors throughout Italy resisting the League 
administration. Among these NGOs are the prominent SAR organizations Sea Watch and 
Open Arms, as well as Mediterranea. This protest was a grand gesture in defending human 
rights and the values of the liberal international order, as well as in direct opposition to the 
nationalist policies and tenets being put forth by Salvini and the League. In reference to the 
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protest and the liberal principles being promoted, Mayor Sala stated that “This is our vision 
of Italy.”  
This event reveals that in spite of a variety of attacks on refugee rights, on NGOs, and 
on civil society, there is still a strong movement of resistance within Italy. This movement is 
helmed by the same NGOs that have been challenged and whose operations in the 
Mediterranean have been cut off by the League administration. While the operations in the 
Mediterranean were largely halted, these same NGOs continued their commitment to 
promoting refugee rights by organizing a large-scale public demonstration. This shows some 
hope. However, the rest of the changes that have occurred since the election of the League 
administration have not been as favorable for humanitarian organizations.  
On the Defensive 
Why is it that NGOs are being targeted specifically in the Italian case? There are a 
number of potential factors. However, the most prominent argument put forth by the Salvini 
administration is that NGOs contribute to an increase in people who ultimately make the trip 
across from Libya or Tunisia. Many organizations have vehemently defended themselves 
against these accusations, and understandably so. These accusations have placed 
humanitarian organizations in a negative and critical spotlight, elevating them to the level of 
scapegoat and damaging their reputations and values in one fell swoop.  
 From the start of the League administration coming to power in 2018, NGOs in Italy, 
like those in the United States, have had to act on a more defensive basis against brash 
accusations of malpractice, illegal operations, and being a “pull factor” to potential migrants. 
These claims are part of a broader debate in the European Union in regards to NGO SAR 
operations. However, they become even more relevant in the Italian case, as they are used to 
67 
 
justify the attacks on humanitarian rescue operations. Salvini has criticized NGOs for being a 
“taxi service” for migrants and asylum-seekers. These organizations have continued to 
defend themselves in spite of the allegations being proven categorically false across multiple 
studies (Arsenijevic et al 2017; Heller and Pezzani 2017; Villa et al 2019).  
The NGO resistance to populist, xenophobic governments is not a story of unbound 
successes. While many NGOs have found new ways to protect human rights the best they 
can, at times NGOs have had to succumb to the political will of the parties in power. For 
instance, the NGO Medecins sans Frontieres had to end all operations of its SAR ship, the 
Aquarius. Since February of 2016, the Aquarius rescued over 30,000 people in the 
Mediterranean. As a direct result of the League administration’s new policies and persistent 
attacks on NGO SAR operations, Medecins sans Frontieres felt like they had no choice but to 
shut down operations of the Aquarius in October of 2018. Until the Mare Jonio set off on its 
SAR mission, Aquarius had been the final NGO ship pursuing SAR in the Central 
Mediterranean for a number of months (Landauro 2018).  
 The Aquarius provided an opportunity for Salvini to play out his populist narrative in 
the national and global spotlight. Salvini made the issue a staunchly political one, and for this 
we see a parallel shift in NGO narrative as witnessed in the United States. Namely, many 
NGO actions have become overtly political. One of the founders of the Mare Jonio initiative, 
Erasmo Palazzotto, stated that the motivations of this mission were no longer merely 
humanitarian but political as well. Palazzotto asserted that “Nowadays saving lives is 
political” (Pronczuk 2018). Whereas only a few years ago humanitarian organizations 
accounted for the majority of the rescues at sea without issue, their evolution into the status 
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of political scapegoat has meant that all of their actions and rescues, no matter how small or 
how few are saved, are now inherently political and defiant.  
 Whereas many NGOs in the United States have actually benefited monetarily from 
the post-Trump election surge in donations, in Italy the case appears much different. Since 
early 2018, donations have dropped up 10%. Many NGO leaders suspect that this decrease is 
a direct result of accusations and attacks by populist leaders such as Matteo Salvini. The 
international press spokesman for Oxfam Italy, Francesco Petrini, stated that the reputational 
damage is more damning that any monetary drop. Petrini stated that “For us, the tragedy is 
not losing money, but losing credibility" (Day 2018) The 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer 
report revealed that Italy is one of 6 nations where the majority of the population distrusts the 
work of NGOs, and is one of four nations where trust in NGOs declined from 2018 to 2019 
(along with Russia, Spain, and to a minor extent, Turkey). Not only is the League 
administration undermining the refugee rights regime, but it is also undermining the values 
and missions of hundreds of NGOs in Italy. Causing the public to question or criticize NGOs 
under false pretenses is greatly detrimental to the tenets of the liberal international order 
being promoted and defended. If the other parts of civil society begin to challenge the place 
of NGOs, then this would be the final nail in the coffin of the shrinking humanitarian space 
in Italy.  
 In February of 2019, these accusations against NGOs came to the floor of the Italian 
Parliament. The right-wing Italian thinktank Center for Political and Strategic Studies 
presented a report suggesting increasing scrutiny and taxation on foreign funded NGOs 
across the civil society sector in Italy. The report referenced recent laws in Hungary that 
enacted these same policies against NGOs. I mention this because, even though these policies 
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have not been adopted as of April 2019, the report signals the larger nationalist international 
movement. The adoption of the exact same anti-refugee, anti-NGO policies attests to the 
collective challenge to the liberal international order and its values. As the spokesperson the 
Italian NGO In Defense Of stated in response to the report, its mere presence in the Italian 
Parliament gives its accusations a sense of legitimacy, and it “is the signal of an increasingly 
worrying trend against civil society at large, that will require the development of appropriate 
strategies and responses ” (“Italy: Debate on NGOs”). The more time NGOs have to spend 
defending their own reputation, values, and operations, the fewer resources and time are able 
to be diverted elsewhere.  
Navigating a Shrinking Space 
As noted in the previous chapter, one new way in which NGOs have been aiding 
refugees and asylum-seekers in Italy has been through the technological initiative SignPost, 
known in Italy as Refugee.Info. This site offers intensive information for refugees and 
asylum-seekers in order to help them access resources such as healthcare, education, or legal 
assistance. Humanitarian NGOs providing key information to new refugee arrivals in a 
country is not new by any means. However, this often required refugees and organizations to 
be in the same place, at the same time. Through SignPost, refugees can now gain this critical, 
trustworthy information no matter where they are, so long as they have a way in which to 
gain access to the site. This initiative becomes particularly important in light of the recent 
Salvini Decree.  
As reception centers are forced to close across the country, civil society has had to 
respond in order to ensure refugee rights are still being protected (Giuffrida 2019a). With 
people being evicted, SignPost provides an important tool for these individuals to access aid 
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moving forward. Apart from the website itself, the initiative provides for fast responses to 
inquiries made on various social media pages. On the Refugee.Info Facebook page, regular 
updates were made throughout the various stages of the Salvini Decree being implemented 
and made into law. Across nearly a dozen posts in reference to the Decree, the workers for 
Refugee.Info responded to hundreds of inquiries by individuals seeking help understanding 
their situation, as well as how to get further assistance and where to find housing with centers 
being shut down.  
Similar to SignPost, a coalition of local NGOs called Tavolo Apolidia, loosely 
translated as “Table for the Stateless,” created an info sharing platform in Italy. The 
coalition’s foremost focus are those who are “in-between” official statuses. This info sharing 
platform provides vital information for access to food, shelter, and legal help, as well as 
information for the public in regard to the issue of statelessness in Italy. While this project 
was not directed towards asylum-seekers specifically at its onset, the recent Salvini Decree 
makes the coalition’s efforts pertinent, as asylum-seekers pursuing a humanitarian asylum 
permit could be forced into statelessness if they were unable to file before the October 2018 
deadline.  
When looking at these two technological examples along with those illustrated in the 
United States chapter, we see an increasing trend in the utilization of what is deemed 
“humanitarian cyberspace” (Sandvik 2016). As Sandvik argues, the use of information and 
communication technology provides an opportunity for humanitarian organizations to expand 
beyond the political shrinking space of operation into a “new frontier” of advocacy and 
knowledge-sharing to those who need it (9). Through social media, apps, and websites, 
NGOs can now better ensure that asylum-seekers and migrants alike are able to access 
71 
 
resources necessary to them. This becomes particularly useful when considering the Salvini 
Decree. Even when individuals are transferred to other reception centers throughout Italy, the 
change of locale can mean refugees are unaware of how to continue to receive certain 
services, such as mental health help, that they had access to prior via NGOs or other local aid 
organizations.  
Conclusion 
 Italy is a unique site in which to examine the work of humanitarian NGOs in response 
to the ongoing refugee crisis. Challenges by the Italian government came even before the 
League administration was elected. However, the new government has continuously targeted 
these organizations more directly. Similar to the NGOs operating within the United States, 
those operating in and with Italy have had to drastically shift their operations and resources 
in order to continue to provide services and defend the refugee rights regime to the best of 
their abilities. This next, and final, chapter will look at viable policy options and steps that 
can be taken by NGOs, states, and IGOs alike in order to mitigate the refugee rights crisis 
and the rise of populism, and to protect the values of the liberal international order.  
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Chapter 5: Policy Lessons, Analysis, and Conclusions 
 
“It is not an issue of capacity, it is purely down to a scandalous lack of political will. We’re 
talking about people who are fleeing from war and persecution, and unaccompanied children 
who are being left alone in overcrowded camps.”  
- Ska Keller, German Member of the European Parliament 
“MSF will welcome a compact that puts people at its heart. A compact that alleviates the 
great suffering that current policies have created. We cannot be blind to the violence endured 
by those on the move. We cannot ignore their despair. Above all, we cannot pretend we don’t 
know what is happening. What is partnership about? Partnership is about standing for 
humane policies.”  
- Dr. Joanne Liu, President of Médecins sans frontières 
 
Introduction 
 This final chapter takes a more pragmatic turn, analysing various policy options 
available on several levels in order to better protect refugee rights, NGO operations, and 
liberal values, if not the liberal international order itself. This chapter seeks to answer the 
question of how NGOs can survive in a declining liberal international order. As demonstrated 
in previous chapters, there is a large-scale undermining of the liberal international order by 
right-wing, xenophobic populists. With this has come the degradation of the refugee rights 
regime, which humanitarian organizations have now come to uphold to the best of their 
ability. Many NGOs have changed their modus operandi and organizational goals as a means 
to resist these populist policies, particularly in the United States and Italy. The threat to 
NGOs, refugees, and asylees is still ever-present, and with this chapter I aim to share some 
hope for the human rights regime and propose how it, and most importantly those whose 
well-beings depend on it, can still be protected. 
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What We Have Learned 
 This thesis has demonstrated the extensive challenges to the refugee rights regime 
that have arisen as a result of new populist-nationalist regimes. The policies and rhetoric put 
forth by these administrations in the United States and Italy have systematically 
disadvantaged humanitarian NGOs in terms of responsibility, resources, administrative 
support, and even public support. We have seen how NGOs have responded with 
increasingly taking on the state’s responsibilities in providing human rights, becoming more 
politically charged in the process, as well as finding new and innovative ways to enable 
refugees and asylum-seekers to find useful medical, housing, and legal resources. Together, 
these changes represent a new era in humanitarian NGO work. So long as populist-nationalist 
states continue to operate in a similar vein to what we have witnessed so far in these cases, it 
is likely that these changes and new modes of operation will persist into the years to come. 
In September of 2018, I had the opportunity to interview Martin Zogg, the Executive 
Director of the International Rescue Committee’s office in Los Angeles.  The key takeaway 
though was that, as Zogg claimed, this administration has signalled the most drastic 
challenge to humanitarian operations that he has faced in his two decades as Executive 
Director with the IRC. I asked him about the challenges that have arisen since the election of 
President Trump, and how things have changed in comparison to President Obama’s time in 
office. When questioned about the biggest issues the IRC faced at the time in terms of 
refugee resettlement, he said: “Housing, jobs, these are problems that have always been 
important. They don’t change from one administration to another. However, what we’ve seen 
with the Trump administration is a new problem of transparency.” The level of openness and 
communication between the administration and the nine voluntary resettlement agencies was, 
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and likely still is, at the lowest point it has ever been, according to Zogg. I think that this 
perfectly encompasses the larger challenges for humanitarian NGOs on the whole. 
 As this paper has shown, these new nationalist governments have proven detrimental 
to the liberal international order and refugee rights. This is not a program of mutually 
beneficial reform, but rather an attack on the notion of human rights and state responsibility. 
They have taken an individualistic, populist approach to free themselves from the “burden” 
of providing human rights and protecting those in need. The resulting changes that many 
NGOs have undergone have been necessary to their survival within the new national (and 
international) order.  
 NGOs in the United States and Italy faced similar nationalist governments who 
imposed anti-refugee policies that often directly and indirectly damaged these humanitarian 
organizations. In spite of the comparable environments of operation, the trends identified in 
Chapters 3 and 4 show similar strategies employed by NGOs in each case. Humanitarian 
organizations in both the U.S. and Italy have become rights providers in response to populist-
nationalist policies, though Italian NGOs, particularly search-and-rescue ones, have received 
immense antagonism from the Salvini administration. With this increasing hostility and 
continued retraction from rights provisions by these governments, it is critical to consider 
policies that can reverse these trends, protect refugee rights and NGO operations, while at the 
same time quelling the general tensions surrounding the debates on asylum-seekers and 
refugees. As such, the policies suggested in this chapter will differ between cases, but will 
ultimately contribute to similar results in the success of NGO operations in protecting the 
refugee rights regime and the values of the liberal international order. 
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Policies Moving Forward 
 There are a number of policies for NGOs, states, and IGOs alike that would be 
beneficial moving forward to better protect refugee rights and the liberal international order. 
The policies I am proposing here are policies that I view as pragmatic and attainable. Each 
section includes a mixture of short-term and long-term plans that would serve to better 
provide human rights to asylum-seekers and refugees as well as, to a certain extent, alleviate 
tensions causing these fulfillment gaps to arise in the first place.  
NGO Level 
In Italy specifically, the situation for NGOs remains much more dire. Each of my 
findings presents certain possible solutions. In terms of the shrinking space in Italy and 
Europe, NGOs should consider shifting resources towards addressing push factors and the 
catalysts of migration. The cyberspace frontier has been one remedy to mitigating crisis when 
people have already arrived in Italy. Working towards alleviating the drivers of movements 
in the first place, when the state is not, could keep people safe and avoid putting them in the 
fray of populist-nationalist policies. Italian NGOs will also have to continue their appeal to 
other parts of civil society and local resistance, as a solo campaign of civil obedience and 
moral disobedience can only last so long without retaliation from the government. Salvini has 
already proposed a fine on NGO ships rescuing those crossing the Mediterranean at a rate of 
5,500 euros per person rescued (Perrone 2019).  
Perhaps their most impactful operational front, Mediterranean search and rescues, is 
no longer an option. In this respect, NGOs can only continue to advocate for the acceptance 
by EU states of those rescued at sea. Legally, NGOs could continue to challenge the Libya 
deal in court and its violation of non-refoulement. Meanwhile, NGOs like Doctors without 
76 
 
Borders/MSF should continue to improve conditions in Libya to the best of their ability. By 
that, I do not mean for them to attempt to solve the ongoing Civil War. Rather, they should 
increase operations to improve the quality and standards in place for migrant centers. If the 
European Union and Italy are to continue forward with using Libya as a reception center or 
outsourcing location, then NGOs should ensure that human rights standard are being met. Of 
course, this would be less of a necessity if the EU had a better resettlement mechanism in 
place.  
In both the United States and Italy, NGOs should continue pushing into the “new 
frontier” of humanitarian cyberspace. With the continuously shrinking space for civil society 
in Italy, NGOs must take advantage of whatever strategies remain to them, as is the case 
here.  
Protests around the respective nations show that there are still people that wish to help. While 
individual NGOs often have pages of their websites or posts on their social media accounts 
signaling how people can help, be it through donations or volunteering their time, it can be 
difficult for prospective volunteers to find out how and where they can help. I believe that a 
useful step forward into humanitarian cyberspace would be the creation of a unified online 
platform across a multitude of NGOs in which one can put in the name of their city and 
discover the various events, groups, and organizations nearby for which they can donate their 
time or money. This is particularly important for Italy, as grassroots partnerships and 
mobilization is key for NGOs moving forward. 
A large tactic of the populist nationalist front is the portrayal of refugees, asylum-
seekers, and irregular migrants alike as existential threats. These have become real fears that 
people in both Italy and the United States have adopted. Not only do NGOs need to continue 
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to advocate for the rights of those seeking asylum, but a more nuanced form of campaign 
needs to take place in order to deconstruct the dangerous narrative presented by these 
administrations. Strong, substantiated counter-narratives are needed to try and inform the 
public and combat the nationalist lines of thought promoted in these states. These counter-
narratives need to be deployed contextually; the grievances towards all types of migrants are 
different in Northern Italy than in Southern Italy, even if there are some commonalities. 
There are some positive examples in the U.S. For example, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society has had publicity campaigns about the accomplishments of prior generations of 
migrants and materials such as stickers that encourage people to identify as descendants of 
immigrants. 
As NGOs in Italy have begun to do with local politicians and other parts of civil 
society, partnerships of this kind must continue in order to foster greater grassroots responses 
on the ground, especially when unexpected policy shifts occur as in the case of the Muslim 
ban in the U.S. Collaborative efforts can mean pooling resources, information, and personnel 
in order to best provide aid to those in need, as well as to create a more unified front against 
these nationalist governments. The Trump administration in particular has shown to make 
policy decisions with little to no warning or communication ahead of time. Thus, extensive 
contingency plans should be established to account for a multitude of restrictive and 
detrimental policies to refugee and asylum rights.  
 It is important to consider the possibility of depoliticization of NGOs moving 
forward. I believe that humanitarian NGO work has become largely become irreversibly 
political. I would argue that the crux of this does not necessarily lie with the what 
humanitarian NGOs are doing, but for whom. NGOs providing medical aid to those in need 
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seems benign enough, but if the who is say, immigrants or asylum-seekers, it can then 
become politically charged. While NGOs could certainly attempt to detach politically and 
appeal to citizens to promote the value of humanitarianism in general, I am skeptical at the 
efficacy of this approach. For that, I can only see humanitarian NGOs furthering their 
political involvement or advocacy. 
State Level 
It is much more difficult to propose policies at this level. While there is hope with the 
U.S. after the 2018 midterm elections, the League remains in solid control of the Italian 
government. As a result, the bulk of proposed solutions to the Italian case lies on the 
shoulders of the European Union. Under the current administration, any proposed policies to 
mitigating the crisis that does not involve deterrence or deportation is tragically too idealistic. 
The May 2019 European Union parliamentary election witnessed a drastic increase in votes 
for the League, signalling that the populist party is here to stay, and voters are okay with that. 
The League’s victory in the polls comes at the same time the populist National Rally party 
(formerly National Front) came out of the elections ahead of French President Macron’s 
party. Additionally, populists held strong in countries like Hungary and Austria.  
My only proposal for the Italian case then has to do with the Libya agreement and 
Salvini’s continued pursuit of outsourcing the asylum and immigration problem. The initial 
policies to address departures from Libya were backwards. They began with training the 
Libyan Coast Guard to intercept and return irregular migrants and/or potential asylum-
seekers, and now are attempting to address the dire conditions affecting these people in Libya 
itself. Médecins sans frontières have seen these conditions firsthand, stating that the facilities 
are overcrowded, lacking sufficient food and clean water, and have little protection from the 
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cold weather. A 2017 United Nation Human Rights Council report also found that from the 
moment someone steps into Libya, they become “vulnerable to unlawful killings, torture and 
other ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and unlawful deprivation of liberty, rape and other 
forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery and forced labour, extortion and 
exploitation by both State and non-State actors.” With these findings, how can the European 
Union and member states legally and morally outsource responsibility to the Libyan Coast 
Guard to keep people from arriving in Europe? This agreement does not work to solve the 
migration crisis - it quarantines it.  
In theory, long-term 3rd country agreements are only humanitarianly viable if the 
rights of those in the 3rd country are upheld to the same degree as they would be in the 
primary party (such as an EU country). Disregarding for a moment the issues surrounding 
detention and processing conditions with the EU itself, both of the main 3rd country 
agreements (Libya and Turkey) have been severely inadequate, and thus should not continue 
in their current state. Human Rights Watch has reported high levels of child labor by Syrian 
refugees in Turkey. In Libya, processing and detention centers for refugees are in ghastly 
conditions and are vulnerable to violence in the midst of Libya’s civil war.  
What then are the alternatives? First, the European Union must not let the 
externalization of resettlement lead to a lax in human rights provisions or conditions within 
the 3rd country. Greater United Nations supervision and aid would be useful to ensure 
conditions and protections are met. Without these protections, the agreements create reasons 
for asylum-seekers to seek other means of reaching Europe, such as making the dangerous 
trip across the Mediterranean. In a way, this is its own “pull-factor,” as individuals not 
wanting to be stuck in Turkey or Libya are pushed more towards crossing into Europe of 
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their own accord. If conditions were safe and stable, then there would be no harm in staying 
in Turkey or Libya while being processed, but this is simply not the case. However, these 
suggestions are moot if the EU and EU countries are simply using these agreements as a way 
to keep asylum-seekers and migrants out of the EU indefinitely, and not as a means of actual 
processing.  
For the United States, these proposed policies are reliant upon Congress. As of the 
start of 2019, the House of Representatives has a Democratic majority, while the Republicans 
remain in control of the Senate. At the very least, these are policies the House Democrats 
should adopt in order to strengthen refugee rights within the United States and resist Trump’s 
pursuit of a nationalist international order. As noted in Chapter 1, the United States is the 
only nation that has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
The U.S. signed the Convention 1995, but a full ratification would show a renewed 
commitment to international human rights laws and norms. This treaty itself is particularly 
important given the large number of asylum-seekers from the Northern Triangle who are 
young children. The Convention explicitly binds ratifying states to it under international law. 
Were the U.S. to have ratified the treaty previously, it would undoubtedly be in violation of 
several articles prescribed by the Convention. In particular, these are articles; 3, which 
ensures the best interests of the child and requires that the rights of the parents in this respect 
must also be acknowledged; 7, the right to know and be cared for by one’s parents; 8, the 
right to family relations without interference; and 9, which ensures a child must not be 
separated from one’s parents unless under extraordinary circumstances or there is reasonable 
suspicion of neglect to the child, and that even if separated, there must be allowed sufficient 
contact between family members and knowledge of their respective whereabouts. The Trump 
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administration’s inability to reconnect separated family members, and its subsequent 
demands for NGOs to reconnect the family members themselves, is direct evidence towards 
the Trump administration’s carelessness towards international law. To ratify and be fully 
compliant with the Convention would mean humane treatment and processing of asylum-
seekers, and would prevent the responsibility from falling upon the shoulders of 
humanitarian NGOs. 
 The United States must increase funding for the asylum-processing system. This 
means increased funding for immigration judges, processing centers, and USCIS 
asylum/refugee officials. Since the Trump administration has cut refugee admissions, and 
therefore cut funding to the nine NGO resettlement agencies, it has newly freed up funds 
available to redistribute. Of course, an increase in efficiency of the refugee resettlement 
system would necessitate increased funds back to these resettlement organizations.  
 Furthermore, a more humane and rights-centric alternative must be found to family 
separation and detention policies. One of the most straightforward steps would be to renew 
the Family Case Management Program, started by the Obama administration in 2016 and 
then terminated by the Trump administration in 2017. Under this program, families that had 
passed the credible fear interview and deemed candidates for less secure types of release 
(such as pregnant women or women with young children) were allowed to live in the country 
while moving forward to asylum procedures. Across the six areas of the country where the 
program operated, local NGOs would help to take care of the program’s participants, helping 
them to understand their rights, giving them access to medical and legal aid, and aiding them 
in the asylum process. This type of policy was lambasted by President Trump as “catch and 
release,” but of the nearly 1,000 families enrolled in the program, 99.3% attended all of their 
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immigration court hearings, and 99.4% attended all of their appointments with Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Cost-wise, required funding for this program was $38 per 
family per day, in contrast to ICE family detention, which costs $320 per family per day 
(“Family Case”). 
 In line with the Family Case Management Program’s incorporation of NGOs in 
helping manage asylum cases, Congress should work to better cooperate with NGOs and 
establish formal channels of cooperation to aid asylum-seekers and refugees. Establishing an 
upfront, collaborative relationship would enable NGOs to retreat from their reactive state that 
arose from the Trump administration’s restrictive and antagonistic policies. Operations such 
as this would also work to combat narratives surrounding refugees and asylum-seekers as 
being lazy, opportunistic, or untrustworthy. It would help to demonstrate that these 
individuals are committed to the legal process, even when Trump administration rhetoric 
portrays them as otherwise.  
 As it exists currently, the screening and interview process for asylum-seekers is 
incredibly inefficient. Once individuals are initially approved for asylum via USCIS asylum 
officers, they must then enter into the immigration court system. Not only is there currently a 
backlog of over 700,000 cases, but the determination and evidence discovery process has to 
begin again before an official ruling is made. Greater investment and training should be put 
into USCIS asylum officers, allowing them to make final decisions. New asylum-seekers 
would only enter into the immigration court system if they attempted to appeal a decision by 
a USCIS officer. In this manner, the backlog would diminish and present asylum-seekers 
would be able to get protection faster and more efficiently. This type of decision making is 
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already present for some forms of asylum, but making it universal would mean better control 
over the process and ensuring timely processing for asylum-seekers.  
 Furthermore, establishing an immigration court specifically for border and ports of 
entry case appeals would help to ensure that the six-month application decision requirement 
is met. This would also signal to those that are not qualified for asylum that they would not 
be able to remain in the United States for any longer than six-months if they appeal the 
decision on their case. Furthermore, the U.S. should renew the granting of Temporary 
Protected Status for those who do not meet asylum requirements, but otherwise need 
protection.  
Intergovernmental Level 
The European Union situation is undoubtedly complex. There are many working parts 
and minutiae that I could not hope to fully address in this paper. Thus, at the EU level these 
policy suggestions are broad strokes that I believe would put the EU on a path to better 
alleviating the refugee crisis and easing the feelings of certain states that feel the EU is 
antagonistic towards them or has left them behind.   
Current European Union level protections of humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations are limited. The 2002 Facilitation Directive to combat smuggling includes an 
article stating that EU member states have the choice to pursue charges against those 
providing humanitarian assistance to migrants attempting to enter into the EU. NGOs have 
been criminalized for helping those in need even prior to the populist nationalist rise (Heller 
and Pezzani 2017). While the 2015 “EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling” stated that 
in 2016 the European Commission would “seek to ensure that appropriate criminal sanctions 
are in place while avoiding risks of criminalisation of those who provide humanitarian 
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assistance to migrants in distress,” it does not appear that any such proposals took place or 
were adopted by the Commission. As such, and as the Salvini administration’s responses to 
and rhetoric towards NGOs have shown, the risk of criminalization of humanitarian NGOs is 
dangerous. The discretion allotted by the Facilitation Directive has led to a lack of uniformity 
among Member States. With Italy’s central position in the asylum-seeker crisis, its ability to 
halt all SARs by NGOs under threat of persecution is in opposition to the values of the EU 
and the liberal international order. Thus, the EU should move forward to protect these 
operations and provide for a long-term solution to processing and resettling those rescued at 
sea.  
 The European Union has been in the midst of a so-called “Australian solution” to the 
migration crisis since the 2016 EU-Turkey deal went into effect. These types of safe third 
country processing programs could work, in theory, but the current nations being utilized for 
this type of outsourcing (Libya, Tunisia, Turkey) are in no position to do so. Libyan 
outsourcing has already occurred in the form of intercepting migrant boats and returning 
them to Libyan shores. Salvini and the League administration have been staunch supporters 
of using Libya as a middleman for processing asylum-seekers before they arrive in Italy 
itself, though the formally recognized Libyan government has been resistant to the idea 
(Wintour 2018). 
  
85 
 
Whether or not resettlement processing outside of the EU begins to work, 
resettlement within the EU needs to be examined again. The Dublin Agreement must be 
addressed and reworked in order to better reduce the responsibilities of the EU’s frontline 
states. The EU must work to provide greater incentive for member states to fulfill their 
quotas. Part of what led to the crisis, as well as to the rise of the League administration in 
Italy, is the failure of the Dublin 
Regulation to adequately and fair 
redistribute new arrivals into Europe. 
Cooperation between governments in 
spite of agreed commitments on paper has 
been weak to follow through on said 
commitments. Stronger cooperative 
policies with streamlined and 
standardized processes for registering 
asylum-seekers and making decisions on 
these cases are absolutely vital. Hard economic incentives need to be instated to address 
discord among various EU member states. Those that still refuse to host refugees or process 
asylum-seekers should be made to contribute in other means to help countries that do accept 
these individuals.  
Among these changes as well should be a definitive relocation system from southern 
European Union states, such as Italy and Greece. The previous relocation plan fell drastically 
short of its goal. However, the crisis cannot be solved without addressing the severe 
adjudication inequality among EU member states. Using a third-party buffer as in the cases 
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of Libya and Turkey has only led to more human rights abuses and problems. European 
Union-sponsored reception and resettlement centers outside of Europe have shown little 
promise when similar “hotspot” centers within the EU itself have failed in many respects. 
One possible solution is to pool reception centers across members states in order to better 
share responsibility, standardize reception centers further, and ensure compliance with 
international human and refugee rights treaties and norms (Fratzke 2015). This would bring 
the core of the asylum and resettlement processes in line with the values and tenets of the 
liberal international order and the standards called upon by the refugee rights regime. 
Future Research 
 There are a multitude of avenues in which future research could shed more light on 
this issue. With populism rising throughout Europe and the potential for a second term 
Trump presidency in the United States, there is a strong likelihood that these parties and 
politicians will remain influential for years to come. At the very least, their policies will have 
successfully done lasting damage to the liberal international order, its values and systems, 
and the refugee rights regime. With that in mind, it would be interesting to follow up on the 
questions posed and analyzed in this thesis two or three years from now, to see what trends, 
if any, become more dominant in the NGO resistance to these policies. Nevertheless, the 
question remains of where to go from here with research. 
 First, let me being by addressing the gaps or limitations of my own thesis here. One 
limit was the lack of firsthand insight into the workings of NGOs in Italy itself. While some 
news interviews proved useful in understanding the actions and motives behind certain 
NGOs, the opportunity to conduct more in-depth interviews asking specifically about 
responses to Salvini and the League administration would prove even more fruitful. This 
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thesis relies more on secondary sources than preferred. With the Italian case, this research is 
limited by the fact that the League administration is relatively new at the time of writing. 
While the administration has made drastic migration and asylum policy overhauls in that 
time, there has been a limited time period for which to examine the responses of NGOs. 
Nevertheless, the comparison between Italy and the United States has proven insightful to the 
study of civil society and humanitarian NGOs. Further research could reveal different facets 
of this field of study. 
 It would be worthwhile to produce a larger scale analysis of NGO efforts on the 
ground in the countries from which asylum-seekers and refugees originate. For instance, in 
the case of the Trump administration threatening to rescind foreign aid to the Northern 
Triangle, along with its continued rhetoric and policies of deterrence, it would be insightful 
to examine how these changes have affected NGOs operating in El Salvador or Guatemala, 
for instance. How are they addressing and working to alleviate the conditions that catalyze 
the need for refugee resettlement in the first place, and how effective are these efforts?  
 Additionally, a further look into the other parts of civil society in working to uphold 
refugee rights would provide a more complete picture of civil society on the whole. As 
mentioned at the start of this thesis, humanitarian NGOs are only one aspect of civil society. 
How has the rest of the public sphere responded to the populist-nationalist rise and its 
undermining of the refugee rights regime? With the increase in social media in recent years, a 
larger change over time analysis in terms of tactics, mobilization, and discourse could be 
useful. How have public-private partnerships worked to counteract hostile policies towards 
refugees, asylum-seekers, and general immigrants, and how has this varied across states? 
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These are only a few examples of what is likely a broader movement of mobilization by 
citizens, outside of NGO operations, to resist these ongoing populist policies. 
Conclusion 
Refugee rights are only one instance of the greater rights rescissions being enacted by 
populist-nationalists. For instance, the Trump administration has consistently rolled back 
protections of the LGBT+ community, particularly for transgender individuals. The 
restrictive and hostile policies towards refugees and asylum-seekers by the Trump and 
Salvini administrations reflects a willingness to target some of the most vulnerable groups, 
and virtually any minority group could become a target next. To uphold refugee rights is to 
uphold human rights altogether. The fight for refugee rights is long from over, as flows will 
likely persist or even increase in the years to come as the number of climate refugees 
increase, and as civil war and terrorist groups continue to cause violence, unrest, and 
instability in parts of Northern Africa in particular. NGOs will likely continue in their new 
operational position through all of this so long as populist-national governments remain in 
power. That is of course unless the shrinking space for civil society does not completely push 
out NGOs from the picture, as it is moving towards in Italy. 
As this paper has shown, humanitarian organizations are in a dire situation 
worldwide. Recent crises of asylum and refugee policies have shown the dangers that have 
come from the rise in nationalist governments, particularly in the United States and Italy. 
These cases have provided a glimpse into the much larger issues of a systematic 
downgrading of the refugee rights regime and a nationalist challenge to the liberal 
international order. As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, NGOs have been openly attacked 
by the Trump and League administrations, and as a result, have had to drastically shift their 
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role within the LIO in order to attempt (both successfully and unsuccessfully) to uphold the 
LIO and its values against the threat of the nationalist international order. Many NGOs have 
successfully been able to adapt and fight for the rights of those being targeted. Further 
operational changes are necessary moving forward in order to continue the resistance against 
the nationalist international order. NGOs are the last gasp of the liberal international order, 
and their success is vital for refugee rights on the whole as well as the interdependent 
protection of human dignity.  
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